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 Hubert Iral 
Between Forces of Inertia and Progress:                         
Co-decision in EU-Legislation 
Introduction 
Many observers claim that the implementation of the Co-decision mecha-
nism with the ESA (1987) and its manifestation in the Maas-
tricht/Amsterdam Treaties (1992/97) could be interpreted as a significant 
step towards more democratic legitimacy in European policymaking. 
This conclusion could come close to reality under two conditions: The first, 
if the EP as the only directly elected decision-making body is comprehen-
sively involved as an equal-footing Co-legislator beside the Council. 
The second, and even more important, is if the Co-decision procedure is 
sufficiently transparent for the European Citizens. 
Therefore, this paper aims to explore, whether these two requirements are 
fulfilled. The following is that a too optimistic assessment of the Co-
decision procedure, as a tool for more legitimacy cannot be justified. 
In order to demonstrate my thesis, I will firstly discuss the general problem 
for European Citizens with legislation at the national and European level, 
specifically regarding the critical question, of how the EU can bring the 
people closer to the Union. 
Secondly, it seems useful to deliver a more comprehensive description of 
the history of the Co-decision procedure, because this gives an insight into 
the development of legislation in the Community. Hubert Iral 
Thirdly, the importance of the Co-decision procedure in the legislation sys-
tem should be examined. In doing so, special regard should be given to its 
integrational significance and to the increasing impact on the structuring of 
the daily life of Citizens 
Fourthly, I will provide an overview of the significant documents concern-
ing the reform discussions as they arose at the end of the 90’s, especially 
since the of the Codecision in practice differed considerably from its inten-
tion in the Treaties.  
Fifthly, I will reflect on my own research on the Co-decision practice in the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2001
1 and compare the adequate 
Rules of procedure with how they are really practised by the both institu-
tions. 
Methodology of analysis 
According to the main guidelines, the paper was to focus on the practice of 
legislation and the accompanying problems.  
Therefore, the paper will not research and discuss the entire theses concern-
ing democracy in parliamentarian bodies, two-chamber-legislation motions, 
articles written about the European legislation bodies etc. According to the 
above-mentioned research task, the paper will be much more a review of 
the practical research in both decision making legislative institutions, espe-
cially those in the Council. It will also describe the experiences of the au-
thor during his research activities with the questioned legislative bodies, 
committees, representatives inside the institutions etc. and their impact on 
the Co-decision procedure. These experiences combined with the findings 
and results of the research will enable the author to characterise the current 
situation of European legislation. Moreover this article assesses the 
changes and difficulties of a future reform in European legislation as part 
of broader and deeper Integration. 
 
1  This paper drafted on a research project by the author at the EPP-Group in the EP. 
In 2001 he was assigned to analyse the Co-decision practice in the EP, and espe-
cially in the Council. The tasks of the project and the results are clearly described in 
part V. p. 35f of the paper. 
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According to the dual-nature of the research subject, the article does not 
only deal with political matters. A good portion of the writing is concerned 
with judicial questions. 
Part I first addresses the psychological hurdles of the average Citizen in 
relation to legislation. In doing so, aspects of mentality, education, infor-
mation etc. were regarded. Secondly, the special distance of Citizens to 
EU-legislation was examined. 
Regarding part II (history), a real description of the development could not 
be delivered without a view of the structural deficits of democracy of the 
Community. This makes up the political-legal ‘unique surroundings’ of the 
Co-decision’s implementation and development. 
In part III, the paper analyses the systematic legal position of this legisla-
tive method in the legislation-framework of the EU, in the time before and 
after the Amsterdam Treaty. In a second step, the research focuses on the 
legal and technical aspects as well as on the concrete practice of the Co-
decision. 
The research in part IV will mainly give an opinion on the reform proposals 
made in different papers, announcements etc. and on the attitude of the in-
volved institutions and persons to realise those proposals. In doing so it will 
be shown, whether and to what extent these institutions and their represen-
tatives have dealt with the matter of ‘Co-decision’ in practice. The research 
will also give an impression of to what extent the different reform ap-
proaches and reform proposals made in that paper lastly were realised.  
Part V relates to the matter of Co-decision and the public sphere in the 
Council. The research will first show the grade of ‘openness’ in the Council 
when it was acting as Co-legislator. For this reason the real ‘nature‘ of the 
Council’s 'public debates’ in comparison with the possibilities for the par-
ticipation of different groups of people from outside in these debates must 
be discussed. Secondly, the questions of how the appropriate Rules of pro-
cedures in the legislative institutions have favoured a good Co-decision 
practice shall be examined. Additionally the approach and the practice of 
those Rules shall be compared. 
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Finally, the paper concludes with some thoughts on how these rules could 
or should be re-structured for more effective Co-decision legislation in the 
area of law and the administration of justice in the EU.  
I. How to help Citizens relate to the Union and the in-
creasing importance of Co-decision 
Usually legislation of a country or a nation is interesting to lawyers, judges 
or other persons in another area of judicial affairs. However, their interest 
is more concentrated on the result of the legislation, the laws themselves, 
because those are the basis and the sovereign framework of their working. 
Much lesser regarded is the analysis of the legislative procedures; the pro-
cedures from the initiative of a law until its final implementation. This in-
terest belongs more to the politicians and the politically interested people, 
but the specialities of the legislative procedures are only scarcely noted by 
them. Even when members of the various parliaments act as legislators, in 
fact only some experts in the appropriate committees are really experienced 
in the background of legislative procedure. 
In regard to the interests of the people of the member states, there is some-
what more interest in the action of the persons involved in legislation, the 
actions of the politicians. These ‘actors’ are regularly the MP, their repre-
sentatives in the parliaments, and the legislation or the laws are part of the 
politics they have promised to fulfil before the election. However, and for 
some reasons which to recount here would be too difficult, most of the citi-
zens of these states are completely uninterested in the legislative proce-
dures. The main reasons for their attitude are: the creation and structuring 
of laws in the parliaments is a strange business and the legislative proce-
dure is an opaque process of political actors on a high and inaccessible 
level. In addition, with less information impact from other sides (schooling, 
public media etc.), these processes are too intransparent for them. It is a 
well-known sociological phenomenon that modern people do not take a 
great interest in matters, which they cannot understand. And because of the 
lack of transparency, one of the most important preconditions for a better 
understanding of the legislative processes is missed. On the other hand, it 
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could be said there is at least an acknowledgement of the legislation, or an 
indifferent feeling to the fact that the state is acting as a legislator. There-
fore, it is not very surprising that there is at least only a little ‘sense of in-
terest’ among the people towards the national legislation processes. 
With regard to European legislation this kind of distance between the peo-
ple and the legislator can also be seen. Between the European Citizens and 
the legislating institutions acting in Brussels and Strasbourg there is also an 
atmosphere of misunderstanding. The only difference to the national mem-
ber state relationship is that the distance between the Citizens and the 
European legislation level is expressed in a much more disquieting manner. 
In the relationship between the European Citizens and the European legis-
lators such a feeling is nearly invisible. Surveys show that only a small per-
centage of interested people are really informed about the (fact of) Euro-
pean legislation. This leads to the problem that the interest of European 
Citizens on European legislation is very low. 
Thus, on the one hand, the discussion of legislation in the EU does not 
seem very helpful for the analysis of ways in which the European Citizens 
could be moved to come closer to the Community. And in the same manner 
it is hard to estimate, how they could be more motivated and encouraged to 
participate in the process of European Integration through a better Euro-
pean legislation. This is especially true due to the reason that processes of 
European legislation are generally less transparent than in the member 
states. 
On the other hand, the subject ‘Transparency in European affairs’ is one of 
the most propagated measures of the European Union to make the Euro-
pean Union more attractive for European Citizens. For example in 1996, 
the Council created a new journal called Transparency. In this journal the 
progress of the Council’s legislative activities were reported monthly.
2. Un-
til 1999 this journal was only available in the office of the Council, since 
1999 (after the ratification of Amsterdam Treaty), it was published for the 
 
2  The Council of the European Union, Transparency, monthly summary of Council 
acts; website http://www.ue.eu.int:; the summary contains: the voting rules, the re-
sults of votes, the explanation of the voting and the statement for the minutes. 
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public. In doing so there is also the hope that the readiness of the Citizens 
to build the Union will increase. Such progress on European Integration 
should not only be a passive acceptance by the Citizens, but much more an 
active adoption process, regarding it as their own affair. To reach these 
aims, a more transparent legislation at the European level is propagated and 
– formally – structured, but the questioned transparency needs much more 
then some legal orders or administrative acts of the Union. In addition, the 
realisation of these measures, especially in the field of legislation and espe-
cially by the Council, is a very slow process. Thus is the hope that more 
transparent legislation will be a significant step to a more accepted Union 
by the Citizens: Up to now this has been more a vision then a concrete aim. 
However, against all these negative aspects, the increasing importance of 
European legislation as the raison d’être of EU-Citizens needs to be re-
garded and analysed. Within this research the most important aspect is the 
analysis of Co-decision, because this legislating method is institutionally 
the most important legislative procedure among all legislative processes of 
the Community.
3 Of the many aspects which lead to this perception, the 
following three main reasons for the Citizens’ view of Co-decision are de-
scribed and discussed briefly below: 
Firstly, there has been a quantitative increase in the use of the Co-decision 
procedure since the Amsterdam Treaty. According to Article 251 EU-
Treaty, the legislative subjects to be regulated by Co-decisions have grown 
from 15 subjects in the Maastricht Treaty, to nearly 40 different matters of 
the Community’s activity. In addition to these facts not fewer than 31 arti-
cles in the Amsterdam Treaty apply to Co-decision subjects. With the ex-
ception of six important legislative areas (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, taxa-
tion, trade policies and EMU) it includes all subjects of EU-legislation. 
Every year there are about 60 – 90 Co-decisions, which are discussed and 
(partly) decided in the legislative bodies of the Union. 
Secondly, there is the obligation to use Co-decision procedure in all cases 
where qualified majority is used in the Council. With the exception of four 
legislative issues, which request an unanimous decision (in the Council), all 
 
3  EP, Conciliation Handbook, 4 th edition, September 2002, p.2. 
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Co-decisions are require to be decided by qualified majority. Therefore the 
timetable of legislative acts (at least theoretically) could obviously be 
shortened and the goal of more effective timely EU-policy 
4 is much easier 
to reach if the laws of the Union are passed in the shortest possible time. In 
this case the law order of a co-decision will take effect near the time of the 
situation, which caused the law initiative. There is no doubt that such well-
structured legislation near the arising problems and close to the reasons for 
a bill can strengthen the efficiency of the EU-Policy. For example a better 
and faster reaction to Citizens’ policy anticipations by the responsible poli-
ticians on a fixed legal base could strengthen the trust of the Citizens in the 
purpose of the EU. 
Thirdly, as the name of the procedure suggests, the two main actors in EU-
legislation, the Council of Ministers, representing the government of the 
Member-State governments, and the European Parliament (EP), adopt EU-
legislation jointly and on an equal footing with equal rights and equal obli-
gations. And because of the fact that the MEP’s are directly elected and 
represent the peoples of the European Union, Co-decision is the legislative 
procedure in which a close(r) connection to EU-Citizens is realised and 
thus legitimate.  
These findings lead to a perception of the importance of the EU-legislation 
and especially of the Co-decisions from the side of the EU-Citizens. 
Today more than 70 per cent of all laws in the (single) member state(s) are 
created and structured in Brussels/Strasbourg. The EU-regulations for in-
stance, the most important group of Co-decision, offer no possibility for the 
national parliaments to give input into such a law. Therefore, the EU-Co-
decisions embody the leading guidelines in the legal framework of the 
European Citizens. 
Given that –normally– a law is a measure of the government to address a 
certain matter, problem, aim etc., and given that a law contains a legal or-
der to be followed by the addressed persons, it  becomes  clear  that           
Co-decisions have a great impact on the structuring of the (daily) lives of 
 
4  EU-Commission: European Governance, A White Paper, Brussels, 25 July 2001, p. 
10. 
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the European Citizens. This is irrespective of whether the Citizens will ac-
cept such an order or not and irrespective whether they are really aware of 
the circumstances or not. Thus, even though the European Union does not 
have a real government, which can be perceived by the EU-Citizens as the 
transmitter of the laws, Co-decisions still serve an important function in the 
sphere of the EU-Citizens. 
II. The History of Co-decision and structural Legisla-
tion-Deficits 
Since the beginning of the European Community, it has been the declared 
aim of most of the founding states that legislation should be made by the 
member states at the national and at the European level. In the last case this 
task was delegated to the sphere of an ‘Assembly of the Member states’, 
the European Council. Logically, no real legislative representational body 
of European Citizens was included in the Rome Treaties. The European 
Parliament with its current legislative rights did not exist; only a so-called 
European Assembly was structured. This Assembly lacked the competence 
to participate in European legislation. The Assembly was only structured as 
a consulting body in all matters of European Integration. The attempts of a 
few states during the consultations to the Rome Treaties, especially those 
of Germany, to strengthen the European Assembly and to invest it with leg-
islative competence were rejected by the majority of the founding states. 
Later, some other attempts to give the Assembly a stronger position, in-
cluding the European legislation process, failed as well. The competency 
on legislation did not increase when the Assembly was transformed into the 
European Parliament (EP) 1979. Only with the European Single Act (ESA) 
of 1987, the position of the EP in legislative matters was strengthened. Due 
to the then upcoming Common Market, which was started five years later 
with the Maastricht Treaty, there was an increasing intention that the rights 
of the EP should be strengthened in order to get easier and better majority 
decisions. After long lasting discussions and some later European Summits, 
these intentions were finally adopted by the Council. It accepted the neces-
sity of greater power sharing with the EP. 
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However, only with the Maastricht Treaty itself and especially with the 
amendment of the Co-decision procedure in Art. 251 Amsterdam Treaty, 
the Council’ s legislative dominance was substantially reduced and in real-
ity shared with the EP. 
The described difficulties until the implementation of the Co-decision 
process were part of the structural deficits in the European Integration proc-
esses, especially expressed in the European legislation system. And at least 
partly, these difficulties are still ongoing vis- a-vis Co-decisions. The main 
problems in this case are based on two essential pillars and they raise up 
several questions: 
Firstly, one matter concerns the structure of participation of the main insti-
tutions in the European legislation. With the Co-decision procedure the 
power of decision-making has changed more and more to a bicameral legis-
lation system. Each law, which was decided by Co-decision, forces the 
Council and the EP to come to a final agreement, whilst the role of the 
Commission was increasingly reduced, conversely strengthening the deci-
sion-power of the EP. Thus in all cases of Co-decision, the legislative pro-
cedure at the European level came nearer to a real Two-Chamber-System 
as is generally used in the legislation at the national (member state) level. 
Formally, one can speak of a symmetrical power sharing between the EP 
and the Council. Therefore, it has been claimed that an increasingly formal 
agreement between the EP and the Council would finally strengthen the 
democratic legitimatisation of the European legislation.
5 Despite these 
changes, this formal framework is only one side of the coin. The flip side is 
the lack of a structural foundation for a real two-chamber-system on the 
European level. Such a system needs a balanced structure between the par-
ticipants, which is based on general common interest. However, this situa-
tion scarcely describes the European system. The European reality is 
marked by the dominance of national interests. Historical reasons, often a 
long lasting sovereignty of the nations, cultural diversities, language barri-
ers etc. have established and fostered a more national orientation. This tra-
 
5  See: Hänsch, Klaus, Europäische Integration und parlamentarische Demokratie, 
Europa Archiv, 41, 1986, p. 1991-2000. 
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dition is mirrored in the behaviour of the Council. In contrast, the EP with 
its directly elected Members of Parliament and its trans-national structured 
Party-groups is much more oriented toward the cross-bordering interest of 
the European Citizens. 
Thus, the question is, how can these formal rules of procedure of Co-
decision be effective in the activities of the participating institutions, e.g. 
the EP and the Council. As described above the Council is the less democ-
ratically legitimated institution, but the image that the Council itself could 
make its inner decisions more effectively with deepened intergovernmental 
negotiations and/or improved decision-making procedures has failed. The 
reason for this is lastly the fact that the Council practices negotiation and 
debates generally behind closed doors. Thus, a second question must be: 
how can the Council move to more public Co-decision behaviour which is 
finally a question of transparency in the Council. 
This transparency is undoubtedly evident in the activities of the EP; all its 
negotiations, committee consultations, debates etc. on Co-decision laws are 
public and they are (at least potentially) able to be followed by the Euro-
pean Citizens. 
However, a third question immediately follows: how does the EP have the 
power to participate in Co-decision processes in an adequate manner? In a 
manner which upgrades a legislative decision from the smallest common 
denominator to a decision which is oriented on the wider supranational in-
terest level; Thus, may be possible in relation with the Commission, since 
the Commission is also more oriented on supranational guidelines than on 
national particularism. 
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III. The Co-decision Procedure in the legal framework of 
the EU and the political contents of Co-decision 
1) Legal-technical aspects 
The inclusion of the Co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty and its 
systematic placement near the top of Part 5, Title I, chapter 2 of the Treaty, 
called ‘The provisions common to several institutions’ shows that this 
method of legislation should be placed in an exposed position in the 
framework of the EU-Treaties. The granted competencies towards the dif-
ferent acting legislative institutions should also clearly express that the 
power of the Council to decide the fate of the Community and the guide-
lines of the common policies via legislation are formally shortened for the 
first time. In addition, the detailed rule contains all the orders of the neces-
sary majority quorums and clearly structured procedures including the im-
portant conciliation rules to reach the aims: a more democratically legiti-
mated legislation in the Union and the passage of laws within a reasonable 
time. 
These aims were strengthened in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), successor 
of the Maastricht Treaty. The procedure of Co-decision was reformed to 
grant more power to the EP to accelerate the laws. In Article 189 b Maas-
tricht Treaty, the Council was generally enabled to adopt a Common posi-
tion when receiving a proposal from the Commission. Originally, it aimed 
to implement a general Co-decision of the EP in all matters of EU-
legislation in order to reduce the democratic deficit at the Community 
level.
6 According to Art. 251 Amsterdam Treaty on the one hand the Coun-
cil is only encouraged to act after obtaining the opinion of the EP on the 
questioned proposal. On the other hand, if the EP agrees, the Council has 
two possibilities to decide a proposal without the force of a long lasting 
legislative procedure. This means: excluding first to third reading and con-
ciliation necessities. 
 
6  See: Schwarze, Jürgen, EU-Kommentar, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden, 2002, p. 2103. 
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The importance of the Co-decision rule increases further in comparison 
with the following Article, regarding the remaining cases of a final decision 
of the Council on European legislation: Article 152 Amsterdam Treaty and 
Article 189 c Maastricht Treaty are not only similar in their main contents, 
especially as the wording of both is nearly identical. Thus in the case of a 
Council’s final decision, there was no necessity for reform. 
In its functionality, Co-decision encloses a two-sided nature. On the one 
hand, it is a common juridical measure, directed toward the member states 
and their Citizens. Additionally, in the optimal constellation this measure 
should be based on the real interest and on the true will of the majority of 
European Citizens. 
On the other hand, Co-decisions, like the other legislative acts of the 
Community, contain law orders, which are obligatory for the member state 
and compulsory for EU-Citizens. 
2) Co-decision in practice  
The usage of the Co-decision after the Amsterdam Treaty offers a mixed 
impression: 
If the subject of a law proposal is a less controversial one, the detailed rules 
of the Amsterdam Treaty combined with adequate rules of procedure lead 
to a relatively uncomplicated and fast legislative procedure inside and be-
tween the participating institutions, committees, working groups etc. In 
these cases the intentions of the Masstricht/Amsterdam Treaties are really 
fulfilled and the Co-decision is able to work towards better Integration. 
However, the number of the unpretentious law intentions is in the minority. 
Mostly the discussed law matters are highly argued over and controversial 
between the acting legislators. 15 sovereign states and nations seek to cre-
ate an acceptable and workable compromise. Thus, problems and difficul-
ties in the legislative procedure are pre-conditioned. 
These difficulties and problems mark the practice of the legislative proce-
dure. If the negotiations on a law proposal inside and between the acting 
EU-institutions infringes on their competencies, power positions, special 
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views and so on, differences will arise and controversies hinder the pro-
gress of a law initiative. 
On top of that, it is not certain that all institutions act strictly along the lines 
of (their own) procedural rules in every case. With sometimes seemingly 
strange interpretation of such a rule, they erect additional hurdles against a 
successful piece of legislation. No one institution can sanction the other, 
and therefore the legislation progress in the particular institution is handi-
capped. It is sometimes possible to go to the European Court of Law, but 
this is usually a long lasting action and helps little in these situations. 
In combination with the necessity of a final agreement and of a common 
adoption of a Co-decision between the opposed protagonists, the current 
Co-decision practice fails to contribute to better European legislation. 
3) Institutional Integration significance 
The increase of Co-decision to 85 per cent of all EU-legislation indicates 
the importance of this procedure as an integration measure. 
If one of the most important Community activities, the common legislation 
suffers such an extension, the weight of Co-decision inside the frame of 
European Integration is not to be overestimated. The transfer of legislation 
areas into the ‘Co-decision’ competencies of the EP shows the intention of 
the Treaty-signatories and Summit participants at Amsterdam to take the 
law guidelines of the Union on a broad-based legislative procedure. 
In addition, these upgrades of the EP competencies explain the increasing 
acceptance of the equal-based power sharing between the EP and the 
Council in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. However, this under-
standing was on the one hand hard to accept in practice, especially for the 
Council, since it was traditionally the ‘owner of the decision-power’ in the 
Community. This aspect explains the occasional attempts of the Council to 
regain small pieces of its former decision making power. Even if these at-
tempts are not spectacular, they are ongoing; the attitude, to erode by short 
steps the Co-decision competencies of the EP and of the Commission are 
described and analysed below. On the other hand, the fact that the Council 
had formally accepted the divided legislative power shows the general     
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ability for reforming the Union’s structure and a principal openness of the 
institutions for an amendment of their power positions. 
4) Political and Practical Impact on the Citizens 
The political, integration-valued contents of Co-decision can be character-
ised in a different manner. On the one hand, there is the above-described 
lack of interest. However, if the people are informed about the circum-
stance of a Co-decision, they regard it as a practical guideline for the struc-
turing of their affairs. In this case, it is important to point out that the Citi-
zens first ask for clear instruction from the laws. They do not like to read 
difficult rules with scarcely understandable contents. Secondly they want to 
be informed in time about the legislative procedure and the progress of a 
law initiative. If both pre-conditions are fulfilled by the Union the Co-
decision could work as a mediating measure to bringing much more trust to 
the character and the purpose of Integration. Thus on the other hand, im-
proving the described time factor and the transparency affair of Co-
decisions is not only a formal matter, but more a political subject reflecting 
the belief of the Citizens in the Union’s ability to look after their interest. 
And it is of good signifier, whether the Union is also willingly to do so. 
The level of Citizen support for the Union could be strengthened or also 
weakened by the handling of the Co-decision procedure. Therefore, the 
handling and the practising of Co-decision are of enormous importance for 
the European orientation of the people. 
IV. Reform-Approaches between 1999 and 2002 
As mentioned above, there are a few problems with the practice of Co-
decision. Regarding these results, particularly, after the adoption of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, many attempts to reform the Co-decision procedure 
were published. The reform intentions were additionally motivated by the 
upcoming enlargement of the Union. It became obvious that a Union of 25 
or 27 member states would not be able to work reasonably without an insti-
tutional reform. 
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Thus, in the context of the discussion concerning the function of an 
enlarged EU different approaches, models, reports, discussion papers about 
a Co-decision reform were thought about, written and offered by the EP 
and the Council. 
The Commission has not participated in a transparent manner on the reform 
proposals. Its task in the Co-decision procedure is in fact not extended to 
the nearer decision making processes; therefore the dividing lines of a dif-
ferent Co-decision practice do not primarily touch the relationship between 
the Commission and the EP or between the Commission and the Council. 
Such a line is much more noticeable in the relationship Council – EP. Thus 
the Commission’s contribution to the reform activities was oriented to-
wards a more consultative and less official role. Actually, with the excep-
tion of the Joint Declaration from May 2001, there was a reform paper pub-
lished by this institution. However, the participation on that paper was 
more formal act and does not depend on a real conviction of the Council. 
Thus, the most important papers of the EP and the Council regarding this 
subject shall be reported and analysed on their possible impact towards a 
reform progress of the Co-decision legislation. Among the reports, articles, 
papers etc. there are a few which are of great importance, such as a report 
of the Council of the Helsinki Summit 2000. Some of these papers were not 
so decisive for the reform results as the other one, for example a report out 
of the EP in April/September 2001. And a few activities were settled more 
on the administrative level with only negotiation announcements. 
Such a difference is also to be seen in regard to the discussed subjects. 
Some of the reform proposals deal with Co-decision legislation itself; some 
of them discuss mainly the accompanying aspect of institutional transpar-
ency and a few regard special methods of negotiation during a Co-decision 
procedure. 
Last but not least, the research papers of the author and of the working 
group in the EPP-faction, as well as the appropriate EP-resolutions, were 
soured by that working group. 
In addition to the above-described reasons for a co-decision reform of pro-
cedural lack in the Maastricht treaty, the reform discussion was often 
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marked by the repercussions of an increasing struggle between the Council 
and the EP. In spite of the formal implementation of Co-decision, its prac-
tice was still handled in relative confusion. There were no fewer than 22 
different procedures, which made even the experts nearly unable to decide 
which of them was appropriate. In addition, the procedures were mostly too 
complicated, long lasting and bureaucratic. In that way the difficulties and 
problems with Co-decision procedures have been increasing. The differ-
ences between the EP and the Council on how to manage this method have 
been rising more and more. The increase acknowledgement of a failure to 
reform the ‘Amsterdam’-Co-decision caused these disagreements and they 
significantly marked the attitude of the main players. 
Therefore, it was no wonder that the EP, which had implemented a far-
reaching transparency order in its legislation 
7 and had finished its part 
much faster than the Council, steadily called for the reform of the Co-
decision procedures.
8 However, the reaction of the Council was rather slow 
and restrained. The EP waited for the result of the Helsinki Summit, but 
from its view the reform steps decided in the conference by the Council 
were much too few to better the practice of Co-decisions. In addition, it 
seemed to the EP that after Helsinki, the Council tried, to foster the inter-
governmental conference (IGC) contacts (between the member states) in 
order to come to a result faster on difficult Co-decisions. The Council ar-
gued that this procedure would be necessary because the EP needed too 
much time to come to an agreement with the Council in the ‘normal’ con-
ciliation procedures. The EP refuted this accusation and criticised these 
ICG-activities. The sharpness of tone in the discussion increased seriously 
and the animosities between the Council and the EP at their peak reached a 
level of accusation. Therefore, the EP decided to strengthen its request for a 
reform of the Co-decision procedure. As the strongest faction, the EPP-
Group was the most reform-interested political organisation inside the EP. 
Especially the General Secretary of the Group, Klaus Welle, forced the re-
form activities. On the one hand he wanted to relax the relationship with 
 
7  See: European Parliament, Rules of procedure, Articles 177, 172. 
8  See: Brok, Elmar, Wer entscheidet in Europa, in: Eichholzbrief, Zeitschrift zur 
Politischen Bildung, Vol 2/99, p. 16. 
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the Council and to bring it back to a more business like level, but was keen 
to reform the Co-decision practice in the sense of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Thus, a lot of the reform papers of the EP were structured firstly by the 
EPP-Group. 
1) Imbeni-Rovan-Friedrich discussion document  
One of the first important papers was a discussion document presented by 
the Vice-presidents of the Conciliation Committee of the EP
9. At the be-
ginning, the paper showed the positive aspects of Co-decision and the au-
thors stated: There is no question that co-decision procedure works and 
works well 
10 and they attested a general change in the behaviour of the 
council towards a conscious strategy of developing contacts with the Par-
liament. These include an increasing number of informal negotiations be-
fore there is the necessity for a formal conciliation. But they also high-
lighted a few eminent risks in the way in which the Council has developed 
contacts with the Parliament. In general, they complained that the Council 
wants the Parliament to organise itself in a way that fits more easily into 
the Council’s way of working. In these perceptions the authors saw two 
manifest dangers concerning the legislative actions of the EP. Firstly, the 
EP could find itself reduced to the role of the 16th member state of the Un-
ion. Secondly, the EP’s open and public debates could tend to be reduced 
by those informal negotiations taking place elsewhere and the essential 
transparency of legislative processes would be put at risk, threatening the 
Agora function of this institution. Against these feared intentions, they ex-
plained, “without prejudice to the prerogatives of either institutions, the 
Council should be encouraged to became more like the EP, not the other 
way around”.
11 Then the authors made a few procedural suggestions to 
reach a real functioning of Co-decision. They include a ‘programming of 
the Co-decision before conciliation’, ‘fast track agreements’, a wider re-
porting of all legislative negotiation, combined with a joint verification of 
 
9  EP, Imbeni, Renzo, Provan, James, Friedrich, Ingo: Discussion document, Improv-
ing the functioning of the co-decision procedure, Brussels, January 2001. 
10  Ibid, p. 1. 
11  Ibid, p. 2. 
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legal texts and – of course – a secured transparency, based on the respect of 
legislative procedures. 
In a report of a joint Co-decision seminar (Parliament, Council, Commis-
sion, held in November 2000), published in July 2001,
12 the same EP-
functionaires suggested a fair compromise between both guidelines of the 
Co-decision procedure. Internal trust and confidentiality of negotiation pro-
cedure should not be diminished by a too strong transparency combined 
with an external visibility, even if the latter course is required by the neces-
sity to enhance the legitimacy of EU-legislation in the eyes of the Citizens. 
In these two papers a few important aspects of the discussion on the reform 
of the Co-decision are really reflected and the proposals of the authors for a 
solution of these problems were easy to understand. 
2) EPP-Report 
In a report of the EPP-Group to its General Secretary, the group dealt with 
the relationship Council/EP and their functions as the Co-legislators of 
Europe.
13 
In the introduction, the Group pointed out the purpose of the paper: the ne-
cessity of an improvement of that relationship, in order to make the Co-
decision procedure more effective. This should be done on the basis of four 
principles: loyal co-operation, transparency, efficiency in the legislative 
procedures and a better structuring of the acting representatives of both in-
stitutions  
According to the theme, the Group analysed several important subjects of 
the Co-decision procedure practice. Part one relating to the Co-decision 
procedure looked firstly at the specialities of the fast-track-method before 
the first reading. At that time this negotiation method caused a lot of scep-
ticism on the side of the EP; the view of the Council at the practice of this 
procedure was especially criticised. The structure of this method will be 
 
12  EP, Conciliation Committee, Activity Report, Annex VI to the Conclusions on the 
European Council Summit in Nice, 2000. 
13  EP, EPP-Group, Report to the General Secretary of the EPP, Strasbourg, 12 June 
2001. 
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described below. Only the resolution of the EPP-Group and its proposals 
for an adequate use of the fast-track-method from its view shall be ex-
plained in the following. 
Accepting that this procedure guarantees great flexibility and implies a 
multiplication of the informal meetings, the Group however complained 
about a few problems and made some suggestions for avoiding the main 
problem, seen by EP. That is, before the first plenary-reading, the negotia-
tion is difficult to check because the reporter of such a law proposal owns 
neither a mandate nor the text of the negotiations, which was how it was 
formulated in the fast track-negotiations. 
Therefore the EPP-Group firstly suggested that before the legislation initia-
tive is voted in the EP-plenary, it is to ensure a vote in the responsible 
commission(s). The Commissions would comment on the possible amend-
ments, and then, before the final vote in the plenary, on the suggestion of 
the reporter, while the EP should have the right to ask for a return of the 
proposal to the Commission. In this case, the procedure is not completed in 
the first reading, but henceforth it exists as a text, that represents the posi-
tion of the EP. On this basis, it can begin negotiation with the Council. That 
should introduce the ' fast-track ' procedure. 
Secondly, the responsible commission, after hearing a representative of the 
Council-Presidency, decides to use this procedure and gives the mandate 
for negotiations. This mandate is to be given to the reporter, to the fictitious 
reporters of the political groups and to the president of the responsible 
commission. In doing so, the official delegation of the EP can start the ne-
gotiations, (but) on the base of formal trilogs in agreement with the Council 
and the Commission. 
In addition: The members of the responsible commission should be in-
formed regularly about the further-prosecution of the debates. Finally, a 
completely new vote in the plenary could take place on basis of the 
(changed) compromise of Commission and EP. 
In part 2 the Group reflected on the time for the final decisions in the 
Council and criticised, that an average decision time of 2 years, 4 months is 
much too long. The Council was asked to adopt the procedures as far as 
  21Hubert Iral 
possible. These findings have been one of the main results during the au-
thor’s researching in the Council; they will be dealt with in a special chap-
ter below. 
Another important aspect in part I dealt with the transparency of debates in 
the Council. The EPP questioned full information about all subjects dis-
cussed about a Co-decision matter inside the Council. This should include 
the papers with the final discussed text, voting details, and the position of 
each delegation participating in the voting. 
Part II of the paper contains the questions on the presence of the Council in 
the EP and the presence of the EP in the Council. The EPP-group suggested 
that in the future a head of the representatives of the Council should be pre-
sent in the final reading of a Co-decision in the EP-plenary. The same was 
questioned in regard to the presence of the EP in the Council. This proce-
dure should mainly secure that a responsible representative from each of 
the legislative bodies could (help to) delete last hurdles for a final decision 
in critical moments of a final debate. In the last consequence, such an ac-
tion could avoid a Co-decision failing at the last minute, as happened twice 
in the time between April and August 2001. In these cases long lasting leg-
islative activities of nearly two years had failed in their purpose and aims. 
With these suggestions the EPP-Group tried to overcome that unsatisfac-
tory situation, not only in regard to the legislation, but also in regard to the 
impression such a failure made in the eyes of the European Citizens 
3) Report on the General Revision of EP-Rules/ Corbett-Report 
Since the occasion of a General Revision of its rules of procedure, in Feb-
ruary 2001, the EP has tried to bring these rules in line with the changing 
requirements of Co-decision procedure after the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Among the different reform intentions, regarding the necessity of im-
provement in the Council/EP relationship, there were two amendments, 
which could be able to substitute the practice of the Co-decision procedure. 
Amendment 20, regarding rule 71, suggested a new paragraph Nr. 4.: its 
wording is: “ The Parliament shall, at the request of the Committee respon-
sible, ask the Council to refer a proposal submitted to it by the Commission 
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pursuant to Article 251 of the EC Treaty again to Parliament where the 
Council intends to modify the legal base of the proposal with the result that 
the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the EC Treaty would no longer 
apply or where it intends to otherwise amend the proposal substantially, 
after Parliament has delivered its opinion, except where this is done in or-
der to incorporate Parliament’s amendments.”
14 
Amendment 16 of the so-called Corbett-Report to these general revisions 
was related to rule Nr. 54 (Interinstitutional agreements), for example the 
above-mentioned fast-track-procedure. According to the report there should 
be a paragraph Nr. 2 added to the rule with the wording: “Where such an 
agreement imply the modification of existing procedural rights or obliga-
tions or establish new procedural rights or obligations for Members or or-
gans of the Parliament, or otherwise imply modifications or interpretation 
of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the matter shall be referred to the com-
mittee responsible for examination in accordance with Rule 180 (2) to (6) 
before the agreement is signed.” In doing so, the EP made clear that such 
an agreement has to comply with primary and secondary Community law 
and can as such not modify nor replace the Rules of procedure of the EP. 
Another intention of these reforms is to be found in the working document 
of this report.
15 In part C ‘Structural Reform’, Title II, the paper propagated 
the combination of Chapter XIX and Chapter XXII of the EP’s rules of 
procedure. This means that in the EP’s rules of procedure the general order 
of openness and transparency in respect of all activities of the EP should be 
extended on the rules of public record of proceedings.
16 
 
14  EP, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Draft Report on the General Revision of 
the Rules of Procedure, (2000/2040(REG)), p. 16, Rapporteur: Richard Corbett, 8 
June 2001. 
15  EP, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Working Document on the General Revi-
sion of the Rules of Procedure, Rapporteur: Richard Corbett, Brussels, 26 March 
2001. 
16  Ibid, p. 16. 
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Both amendments are significant marks of the EP’s attempts to prepare its 
own working base for a better functional Co-decision procedure oriented 
on the practice of interrelation with the Council. 
In the final version of the report there are two further interesting amend-
ments regarding the current matter. Amendment 36 suggested reforming 
the right of the EP President in the Conciliation procedure. Currently, after 
the Council does not approve all Parliaments’ amendments to a common 
position, the EP-President in consultation with the chairmen of political 
groups, responsible Committee etc. agrees a time and place for the first 
meeting of the Conciliation Committee. In the future this agreement should 
be structured together with the Council. And it should be taken at a much 
more earlier stage, namely, when the EP is informed by the Council that it 
is unable to approve all amendments. 
17 
Amendment 31 contains the problem of the representation of Parliament in 
Council meetings. According to a new Article 62 a, the chairman or the 
rapporteur of the committee responsible, or another Member designated by 
the committee should be asked by the President to represent the Parliament. 
18 
4) Poos-Report 
The paper, researched in the following, is not so useful despite the interest-
ing title. ‘The Report on reform of the Council’ was published by the EP in 
September 2001 and it is usually called the Poos-Report (after the rappor-
teur, MEP Jacques F. Poos)
19 According to the title, the central aspect of 
the report was the question of why and how to reform the Council as a 
whole. Therefore the report dealt with broad scale aspects, regarding the 
so-called dysfunctions of this institution. However, the only interesting as-
pect here is the concern to the Rules of procedures of the Council. As the 
report truly pointed out, the rules contain few orders for transparency in the 
 
17  See: EP Session document, 1999 – 2004, Report on the General revision of the Ru-
les of procedure (2001/2040(REG), p. 25. 
18  Ibid, p. 22.  
19  EP, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Report on Reform the Council, (2001/ 
2020(INI), Rapporteur Jacques Poos. 
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legislative acts in the Council. However, the report remains too superficial 
and it does not really give appropriate answers to the questions. Thus the 
suggestions for a reform of transparency, are formulated in a few vaguely 
sketched announcements and postulations.’ For example two formulations 
of this passage “A suitable procedure (press conference or press release) 
should be found to allow the presidency to comment on the items on the 
agenda of the General Affairs Council, when appropriate.” And later on 
there was written: …”steps will have to be taken to ensure that delibera-
tions and decision-making are also made public.”
20 However, press confer-
ences and press releases are one of the current usual public activities; it is 
not really necessary to establish them. About the difficult questions, in 
which framework and to which extension such press information today 
happens, and how information abilities should be improved by the Council, 
the report provides no answer. 
5) Nickel- Non-paper 
The administration body of the EP made two reform proposals in those ti-
mes. 
The first was so-called NONPAPER sur la procédure de codecision.
21 
Dietmar Nickel, Director General of the General Directorate 2 of the EP, 
structured it. In the most important part B Nickel analysed the “Procédure 
en codecision. Les trois phases” 
In phase B1 he suggested a well-organised program of the structure of the 
procedures together with the Council. In this program there should be a dif-
ferentiation between the ‘dossiers susceptibles’ and the ‘dossiers pri-
oritaires’. The first one regards law initiatives, which were able to be de-
cided without longer discussions and negotiations in the first reading. The 
second one belongs to such law proposals, which need a complete Co-
decision procedure since the subject is too difficult and controversial to be 
discussed in the Council. 
 
20  Ibid, p. 15. 
21  Parlement Européen, Direction Général, des Commission et Délégations, NON PA-
PER sur la procédure de codécision, Bruxelles, le 29 août 2001. 
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The working base of all the activities should be a synchronised timetable of 
the activities of the acting commissions, of the meetings of the EP- working 
groups and of the COREPER (Council). 
The Fast-Track-method in Co-decisions was dealt with in phase B2. Nickel 
agreed that this method could speed up the legislation process, but he 
wanted to only use it in the cases of dossiers susceptibles. And he pointed 
out, this method has to be used in accordance with Articles 64 par. 2 
(Transparency in the legislation process), 66 (Commission and Council po-
sition on amendments) and 69 (Adoption of amendments to a Commission 
proposal) of the Rules of Procedure of the EP. 
The central aspect in phase B 3 was the question of a harmonising the 
Rules of Procedures of the EP and the Council. Therefore it was a logical 
next step to start with an analysis of the Rules of Procedures of the Council 
in order to prove their pro-harmonising contents. Thus, requesting the re-
sults of the research of the author, he questioned the practice of the Council 
in the cases of Co-decisions. The practice according to Art 8, 9 and 5 were 
seriously criticised by him. There were too great differences between the 
rules’ order and the legislative practice, he announced in accordance with 
the author. 
Part C delivered a definition of the ‘appropriate contacts’ during a Co-
decision. This means a procedure with pragmatic steps and flexible meas-
ures. However, according to Nickel, that procedure must be based on the 
principles of democracy and public openness. From this view he would like 
to welcome the so-called non formal contacts, as for example, the trilogies 
during the first and the second reading. 
Regarding the other informal contacts with the Council he questioned their 
complete announcement to the rapporteur, to the acting members of a 
commission and to the President of it or alternatively to the shadow rappor-
teurs. 
Part D dealt with the representation of the Council at the responsible 
Commissions of the EP and part C with the presence of the EP in the 
Council. Both activities were wanted again and again by the EP for a better 
and faster legislative process. 
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6) Note on Co-decision and Conciliation  
Julian Priestley, General Secretary of the EP, structured the second ap-
proach. In April 2001 he wrote a NOTE to the Conference of Presidents on 
the subjects Co-decision and conciliation.
22 
At first, Priestley took a summary of the discussion about these subjects in 
that time and then pointed out that the Council had primarily been respon-
sible for a dramatic increase in the number of informal meetings. 
Therefore, in contrast to the above described welcomed result of the joint 
Co-decision Seminar in November 2000, he limited it to a “well working 
conciliation procedure”
23 Then he reflected on the necessity of transpar-
ency and effectiveness in a good balance of Co-decisions and he propa-
gated a development of joint press conferences at the Council and the EP, 
as was done for the first time in February 2001. For the same reason 
Priestley propagated an improvement with the respect to the Internet sites, 
of both institutions. Then he argued for restricted trilogies meetings. On the 
one hand they were a good compromise to overcome the entire conciliation 
Committee, often attended by more than 100 people.
24 On the other hand it 
would be important to ensure its success by informing the members of the 
EP-delegations, acting in the Council continuously and completely.  
Part 2 of the NOTE was titled ‘Proposed Improvements in the procedure. 
In this part Priestley at first propagated a maximum of transparency without 
endangering the effectiveness of that procedure. To reach these goals he 
suggested: 
-  In relation to Co-decision files in first and second readings, addition-
ally the preparation of a legislative ‘tableau de bord’ by the Director-
ate B of Director General. This tableau shall provide a comprehen-
sive overview of all Co-decision files as well as the differences be-
tween the EP and other institutions, e.g. the Council. In doing so the 
 
22  EP, Secretary General, NOTE to the Conference of Presidents, Brussels, 3 May 
2001. 
23  Ibid, p. 1. 
24  Ibid, p. 2. 
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called contents could be distributed to all MEP and all political 
groups in the EP. 
-  In relation to the organisation of conciliation meetings the fixing of a 
certain day each week, reserved for all kinds of meetings with the 
Council in conciliation. 
-  In relation to trilogies the receipt by a participation all at least impor-
tant details of each trilogue, including timing, participants to all 
members of delegation, even when they are not in attendance. 
A further aspect in the note was dealt with the attendance of trilogies. It 
should be restricted to 10 persons as previously agreed, the same limit on 
the number given to the Council. Between trilogies and delegation meet-
ings for the reflection on trilogue results, there is to be given adequate time 
to enable members to consider fully the outcome of the trilogies and to 
consult before they are called to take decision. 
With all these proposals Nickel and Priestly tried to contribute to resolve 
the differences in the relationship between the EP and the Council. With a 
lot of structural reform steps, they were keen to restructure the Co-decision 
procedures in accordance with the public interest.  
7) Trumpf/Pirris-Report 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty the only, but also most important reform ap-
proach of the Council was the ‘Report on Operation of the Council with the 
enlarged Union in prospect.”
25  
Originally the report was ordered by the political Council members in order 
to deliver a few reform proposals to the Helsinki Summit in December 
1999. As the title expressed clearly, the main reason for the task was to 
consult the politicians. They wanted to hear how a future Union of ap-
proximately 25 – 27 would be able to work reasonably. With the report, the 
 
25  The Council of the European Union, Report by the Working Party set up by the 
Secretary General of the Council, (Trumpf/Pirris-Report), Operation of the Council 
with an enlarged Union in prospect, Press Release Nr. 2139/99, Brussels, 10 March 
1999. 
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structural difficulties as well as the procedural problems in the Council 
should be analysed and discussed with a view towards that enlargement. 
However, on the occasion of a far-reaching reform order, the authors of the 
report started with the attempt to improve all other flaws in the functioning 
of the Council. Thus a lot of the reform proposals are nearly of revolution-
ary character. 
All chapters are structured in three parts: the Background, the Analysis and 
the ‘Avenues to be explored’. With regard to the current paper the main 
important chapter is that of the “Legislation Role” (chapter 6). Afterwards 
there is also the interesting chapter 7 (External Communication) and of less 
interest Chapter 8 (Preparation for Council Meetings). 
Regarding chapter 6, its importance is mostly due to its dealing with the 
aspects ‘Background’ and ‘Analysis’. Up to that time such a clear and open 
description of the problems in respect to the Council’s legislation acting 
had been very seldom seen, especially not out of the Council itself. As the 
authors explained, for a few important reasons the view was concentrated 
on the situation of Co-decisions. In the Background they truly pointed out 
that with the Amsterdam Treaty the role of the EP as a considerable Co-
legislator was extended and strengthened. Therefore the Council needs to 
improve public information as it was already given yet in the EP. However, 
against these intentions the ‘fathers’ of that Treaty “ bore in mind that a 
general opening to public of the Council when acting as legislative capacity 
could impact the effectiveness of negotiations driving from outside the 
chamber, which would run counter to project of exercise.”
26 Therefore 
some rules in the Treaty open a door for the Council to escape from strict 
public orientation. Then the report argued that the legislation becomes 
additionally complicated because the current conciliation procedure is too 
complicated and needs too much time. It measured the length for a decision 
(common position) of two years 
27 and continued, “In respect of the               
 
26  Ibid, p. 19: 
27  Ibid, p. 19; this number is a little smaller than the result of the research of the author 
which counted two years and 4 months as average duration; see Table 1.  
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increasing number of Co-decision subjects since the Amsterdam Treaty, it 
is an unjustifiable situation” 
The suggestions how to solve or at least to better this as they were given in 
the ‘Avenues’ of the chapter, significantly touch the problems and Avenues 
of the following chapter (7). 
In the ‘Background’ of this chapter, the report agreed at first with the posi-
tion of the author of this paper that the secrecy of the Council is one of its 
greatest problems, since due to this secrecy the existence of the Council as 
a legislator is less known by the public. This lack of knowledge enables the 
Council to act as a kind of secret institution – less susceptible to democratic 
control by the European Citizens. Therefore “‘positive’ Union decisions 
can be offered as a national political triumph, while the blame for results 
less favourable to national interests is placed on ‘Brussels.”
28 According to 
the report, in the Council meetings all participants of course, eager to relate 
the course taken by decisions according to their own perception and their 
political interests. 
However, the negative image of the Council is due not only to ‘inner af-
fairs’ in the Council. In the same manner there is a serious problem with 
the external communication attitude of the institution. For example: Over 
85 % of the public say their only source of information on European affairs 
is television, yet the debates for the present broadcasts on television are for 
the most academic set pieces, unrelated to the Council’s real political or 
legislative business. 
These announcements in the report were similar to the findings of the au-
thor’s own research; they shall be more closely analysed in the chapter 
about this research below. 
Even if the wording in the analysis is clear enough, much more unusual 
were the suggested Avenues in chapter 6 and 7. Under the general guide-
line ‘ensure that proper legislative practices‘ the report offered a few inter-
esting reform proposals. 
 
28  Ibid, p. 21. 
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At the beginning, the report asked for a greater openness in the Council 
when acting in a legislative capacity. The directive seeks to “ Make pub-
lic”, upon request and at a later time which might be the date of entry into 
force of Regulation or the deadline for transposing a Directive, all docu-
ments relating to the preparatory work on legislation. Thus not only the fin-
ished legislation is to be brought to a higher public level; in the report the 
same is questioned in respect to all stages of the legislative procedure. Sig-
nificant for the tendency in this report are also the following two requests: 
“Open some of the Council’s legislative debates to the public” and “Im-
prove public information on the role and work of Council and replace cur-
rent practice of open Council debates by opening genuine debates to the 
public, e.g. at the initial stage of discussing a major legislative proposal.” 
These requests were completed by a few more technically structured pro-
posals, as stated in the above-analysed contents in the centre of the Council 
research of the author. 
Thus the proposals to “step up the Council’s Presidency’s action in the 
field of communication” and “Equip the Council’s headquarters with the 
necessary technical infrastructure to supply Member states television chan-
nels with pictures, in particular the press conference room and all confer-
ence rooms” shows that the editors have seen this part of decision making 
process is lacking too. 
To sum up: the whole tenor of the report is insofar surprising since the re-
sponsible editors of the report are/were leading persons of the Council’s 
administrative body. Jean Pirris is still Director General of the Legal Ser-
vice and Hans Trumpf was for many years the Council’s Secretary General. 
However, it must be said that Mr. Trumpf had published the report two 
years before he retired. This may have contributed to the brave reform 
amendments on the Council. Whereas during his research in the Council 
the author had the experience that the responsible administration members, 
he had talked with, are often much more willing to discuss the reform in-
tentions of the Council. Sometimes the readiness of the administrative body 
to march through the reforms for more transparency and democracy in leg-
islation was clearly expressed. And in many situations when the Councils 
  31Hubert Iral 
Co-decision procedures have been discussed, the Trumpf/Pirris-Report has 
been brought up as the most well-structured reform attempt of the Council 
up to now. 
8) Helsinki-Recommendations 
The importance of the report can be seen by the way it was viewed by the 
Summit Members of Helsinki. Most of the reform suggestions were refused 
by the Summit participants and only a small part; with relatively less mean-
ingful intentions were adopted. This is shown in the title and the foreword 
of the “Guidelines for Reform and operational Recommendations” ap-
proved by the Helsinki European Council (10. /11. December 1999).
29 
On 11 pages, the chapters A – K contains 54 adopted subjects. In compari-
son to the extension of the report, it is a very limited volume. This relation-
ship is also to be seen in the corresponding chapters. 
In the content of the paper there are two chapters relating to the Council’s 
future legislation. Chapter D is titled ‘The Council’s Legislative Role’. Its 
first guideline is called “Proper use of legislative instruments and improved 
drafting quality”, a very simple postulation. Guideline 2 titled ‘Improved 
codification procedures’; it is given in order to speed up work on the codi-
fication of legislative texts. However, a relatively small place is reserved 
for the guideline titled: ‘Making the co-decision procedure more effective. 
The first postulation states: “The Presidency shall, as an integral part of its 
programming; take due account of the requirement to schedule conciliation 
and preparatory meetings, bearing in mind the applicable for codecision 
procedures. Contacts with the EP at first and second reading stages must be 
undertaken with the aim of bringing the procedure to successful conclusion 
as swiftly as possible.”
30 In the same simple manner the second announce-
ment is formulated: “The Presidency and General Secretariat are invited to 
propose by the end of 2000 further changes in the Council’s working     
 
29  The European Council, Guidelines for Reform and Operational Recommendations, 
approved by the Helsinki European Council, Helsinki, 10/11 December 1999. 
30  Ibid, p. 5. 
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methods in dealing with co-decided acts in the light of the experience ac-
quired in implementing the Joint Declaration of May 1999.”
31 
Regarding the detailed structured reform proposals and broadly discussed 
amendments on the reform of the legislative procedure in the Council, writ-
ten in the Trumpf/Pirris-Report, the announcements of the European Coun-
cil are really less substantial. The vaguely formulated suggestions for a 
changing attitude of the Council in the legislation, e.g. the Co-decision pro-
cedures are poorly defined. 
In the view of the Trumpf/Pirris-Report and in regard to the research of the 
author in the Council, chapter H is the second most important one. It deals 
with transparency, a matter that was also at the centre of the author’s own 
research. 
Guideline 2 of the chapter is related to the problem of greater openness by 
the Council when acting in a legislative capacity. In doing so the European 
Council suggested: “The General Affairs Council and the ECOFIN Council 
shall each hold a public debate every six months on the Presidency’s work 
program. At least one public Council debate should be held on important 
legislative proposals. COREPER shall decide on public debates by quali-
fied majority.”
32 In order to ensure more interesting public debates, the 
European Council has finally made a few technical proposals, but they are 
not really helpful for more transparency in the legislation. In addition, the 
transparency chapter of the paper contains no suggestion for transparency 
of the Co-decision procedure itself. And nothing is said of how the Co-
decisions could be distributed more widely in the sphere of the European 
Citizens, as was clearly proposed in the Trumpf/Pirris-Report. Even if the 
Council is not directly responsible for the proposals or recommendations of 
the European Council the connection between the first and the later is, in 
respect to reform proposals, significant. In both institutions the member 
states are the decisive body: in the Council of ministers and in the Euro-
pean Council the heads of government or the heads of state. If the Euro-
pean Council was willing to accept more transparency in Co-decisions, the 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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representatives of the member state in the Council would not really reject 
that decision. 
Thus the low rate of acceptance of the Trumpf/Pirris-proposals by the 
European Council is transposed onto the Council itself in Brussels. 
9) Joint Reform approaches 
The most important joint approach of the three legislative institutions was 
the Joint Declaration of May 1999.
33 
After the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty by all member states, the 
acknowledgement of the EP, the Council and the Commission, it was nec-
essary to create a common position on the new co-decision procedure, 
which led to their Joint Declaration.
34 In the preamble the (three) institu-
tions “confirm that the practice should be extended to cover all stages of 
the co-decision procedure. The institutions undertake to examine their 
working methods with the view to making effective use of all the possibili-
ties afforded by the new co-decision procedure.”
35 
In regard to the researched subject the most important is chapter 1 of the 
declaration which ruled the first reading stage as follows: “The institutions 
shall co-operate in good faith with a good view to reconciling their posi-
tions as far as possible so that wherever possible.” To reach these aims, the 
institutions obligated themselves to co-ordinate their respective calendar of 
work, as far as possible, in order to facilitate the conduct of proceedings at 
first reading in a coherent and convergent manner in the EP and the Coun-
cil. 
36 
In the second chapter regarding the procedure during the second reading 
the most important aspect is the postulation for appropriate contacts. This 
 
33 European Communities, European Union, Selected instruments taken from the 
Treaties, Book 1 Volume 1, Interinstitutional texts, K, Joint Declaration of 4 May 
1999 on practical arrangements for the new co-decision procedure, Article 251 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community, Luxembourg, 1999, p.1039.  
34 Ibid. 
35  Ibid, p. 1041. 
36 Ibid. 
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should lead to a better understanding and finally to legislative procedure to 
a conclusion as quickly as possible. 
On the face of this declaration it seems that the new defined practice in Co-
decision could contribute to the fulfilling of the order of Art. 251 Amster-
dam Treaty, which regarded the tightening and the simplification of the Co-
decision procedure as a matter of priority.
37 However, the formulation ap-
propriate contacts ‘may be established‘ was only a could-be-rule with at 
least only an appellation for a complementary practice by the signers of the 
declaration. Thus, the success of the declaration depended mainly on the 
good will of the acting organs and its important purpose, a more efficient 
i.e. a faster legislation, was based on the fulfilment of this contract. How-
ever with the declaration the central difficulties in respect to the Co-
decision practice were not really diminished. Thus, it was not long after the 
adoption of the declaration, when the usual differences between the institu-
tions and especially those between the Council and the EP had over-rolled 
the spirit of the declaration. 
10) Exchange of Letters 
During the first half of the year 2000 in an ‘exchange of letters’ between 
the Secretary Generals of the three institutions, an essentially technical is-
sue was discussed with respect to the Co-decision practice. Since the end of 
1999, the Council as the result of the first and second reading of the EP, has 
not received amendments as they were voted in the EP-Plenary, but instead 
consolidated texts that consist of a unilateral redrafting made by the EP 
services. These redrafted papers contain not only of the amendments voted 
by the Council, but also of the Commission proposal (in the case of the first 
reading), or of the common position (in the case of the second reading). 
Against that procedure, the Council’s (and the Conciliation Committee’s) 
work has always been based exclusively on the amendments voted in the 
Plenary. In its letter to the EP, the Council declared that the Council has 
 
37 Callies, Christian, Ruff, Matthias (eds.) Kommentar zum EU-Vertrag und EG-
Vertrag, 2. Auflage, Neuwied/Kriftel, 2002, p. 2230. 
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never approved this practice that in fact alters the presentation of the actual 
result of the vote in the EP. 
In spring 2001 the differences between the Council and the EP on the prac-
tice of the Co-decision increased seriously and the tone between both insti-
tutions, on how to manage these problems had been sharpened in an un-
usual manner. 
Therefore the Conference of Presidents of the Party-groups of the EP de-
cided to write a letter to the Council Presidency in order to refuse this situa-
tion. In this letter the Presidents referred to the spirit of the Amsterdam 
Treaty and they asked, whether the Council would be willing to change its 
practice in several important points of the legislative procedure. Addition-
ally the Presidents mentioned that the Council does not really fulfil its self-
obligation towards a common legislative procedure, as it was fixed in the 
‘Joint Declaration’. 
In concrete, the Presidents criticised the interpretation of the ‘appropriate 
contacts’ by the Council.
38 It seemed to the Presidents that the Council has 
disproportionally favoured the informal meetings and discussions without 
the participation of the responsible representatives of the EP. In connection 
with the usual practice of the Council to debate legislative matters, includ-
ing those of the Co-decisions without public participation, the EP men-
tioned a proper democratic scrutiny for these procedures. Further on, the 
absence of information on the Council’s position during the negotiations 
was criticised and it was asked whether the Council could be present in the 
meetings of the EP’s committees, especially after the adoption of its ‘com-
mon position’. 
In its answer
39 the Council pointed out that the Co-decision is based on the 
principles of understanding and mutual respect of sometimes fundamen-
tally different ways of procedure in each institution; these principles are 
reflected in the Joint Declaration. On these basic agreements, a new open 
 
38  The European Parliament, The Conference of Presidencies, Letter to the Council, 
Brussels, 23 June 2001. 
39  The Council of the European Union, The President, Letter to Ms. Nicole Fontaine, 
Brussels, 15. 05. 2001. 
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and result-oriented spirit of co-operation between the EP and the Council 
has been gradually established. This could be seen in the procedures of the 
‘enlarged informal trilogies’ and of the ‘enlarged trilogies’. The first in-
cludes the participation of the shadow rapporteurs and of the co-ordinators 
of the political groups in the EP, whilst the second one only refers to the 
participation of the co-ordinators of the political groups. 
Beside this, the Council agreed to the need for a proper democratic scrutiny 
of Co-decision procedures at the level of the EP and on the national parlia-
mentary level. Additionally, it would be able “to explore the possibility on 
a case-by-case basis of presenting to the committee background informa-
tion on the reasons behind its common positions in accordance with its 
rules of procedure.” 
However, the Council refused a change in the present situation as far as 
negotiation practices are concerned.
40 
V. Research in the EP and the Council 
1) Research project of the EPP-Group 
All the above-described aspects came to be the reason for the EPP-Group 
inside the EP to research the problems and difficulties in the Co-decision 
procedure and led the EPP-group –as it was mentioned above– to a re-
search project on the necessary reforms of the practice and of the rules of 
procedure of the Co-decision. The findings of the research were to be 
shown possible measures for reforming Co-decision procedures. 
At the core of their findings of the EPP-group tried to discover some inten-
tions for the debate on the Co-decision reform, at first inside the EP. The 
research results were secondly to show how and which kind of proposals 
could be offered by the Group and by the EP in the negotiations with the 
representatives of the Council. Inside the responsible committees which 
worked in that time on the problem of a Co-decision reform, these findings 
were also be used as political and judicial arguments from the side of the 
 
40  Ibid, p. 3. 
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EP. The aim and the main purpose of these negotiations were not a formal 
or theoretical improvement of the Co-decision, but much more the discus-
sion of the possibilities for a faster legislating procedure in practice, and the 
chances of more transparency of these procedures. 
The task was delegated first to the author of this paper in the spring of 
2001. Later on he acted as the vice-chair of a faction-based working group 
in the EP. This group delivered five reports and the final study was finished 
at the beginning of 2002. During this time, the author/working group re-
searched the basics of the Co-decision procedure in the EU. 
As the EP was thinking about and working on a general revision of its own 
Rules of Procedure, at the same time the research was co-ordinated with 
those larger activities. However, at the centre of the Group’s interest there 
were naturally the legislation attitudes of the Council in the case of Co-
decision procedures. The attitudes in the first and second reading were of a 
great interest. 
The research contained three main parts with a few chapters in each part. 
The first part concentrated on researching the average time needed for a 
decision in both institutions. In doing so, they were to research the Co-
decision steps of both institutions in all Co-decisions within a certain legis-
lation period. It seemed useful to research the time between 1999 and the 
first half of 2001. 
In that period of time a legislative procedure developed, which allows a 
meaningful view of the possibly changing practice in Co-decisions after 
Amsterdam. Additionally, in 1999 there were two important points to con-
sider. Firstly, it was the year before the Helsinki Summit, which was 
planned to mainly discuss the institutional reform after the ratification of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. This includes the question on the success of the 
new Co-decision and especially of the practice of this legislative method. 
Secondly near the Summit the Council have prepared an important report, 
the Trumpf/Pirris-Report, which – see above – additionally researched the 
problems of the new Co-decision. Thus it would be interesting, if there was 
a significant, or at least a relative change, in the Co-decision practice of the 
Council after the adoption of that report by the Summit participants. 
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The second part was caused by the results of the first and related to the 
question of how many aspects of the reform proposals, regarding the Co-
decision practice, from the Trumpf/Pirris-Report were adopted by the Hel-
sinki Summit. This followed immediately from a closing question, what 
were the reasons for the (researched) results regarding the attitude on the 
Summit. 
The third part focuses on the public access to Council meetings at which 
Co-decisions were debated. This should give a picture of the willingness of 
the Council to ensure (more) transparency. 
The last part dealt with a comparison of the Councils Rules of procedures 
and its practice in regard to the adequate rules on Co-decision. This should 
explore whether the Council has adopted the recommendations of the Hel-
sinki Summit or not. In addition this research should also show to what ex-
tent the (reformed) Co-decision rules were really heeded in its legislation 
practice. 
Beside the Trumpf/Pirris-Report in the research, and especially in the as-
sessment on the reform intentions and results included, the other above re-
form papers of the Council were analysed either independently or together 
with the other institutions  
2) Co-decision procedures in the EP and the Council 
At the beginning of the research a first view already showed that the legis-
lation processes in the Council were much more extended than those in the 
EP. To justify or deny that image it was necessary to research the single 
Co-decision procedure during its different steps in both institutions. For 
this purpose the reported procedures to each initiative has to be analysed as 
they were published in The Legislative Observatory of the EP 
41according 
to the by-passed stages of a law initiative. The addition of all the time sec-
tions of each Co-decision-stage (readings and preparatory times), differed 
in both institutions, and the analysing of the researched Co-decisions led to 
the following result and the pictures in Table 1: 
 
41  EP, The Legislative Observatory, Procedure file, Consult any historical information, 
published on the EU-website; www.europarl.eu.int.oeil. 
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After receiving a law proposal from the Commission, the EP debated the 
proposals until its first reading for on average of five months. In one case 
the EP needed one year, and in seven other cases the duration reached 9–11 
months. Also interesting were the not shown data, regarding the different 
law subjects. The longest period, 11 months, was needed in the case of an 
Environmental law (regarding Water Protection policy). Of those needing 
(nine months) were two law proposals, regarding to Health policy, one in 
the area of Consumer protection, one regarding Trade-, and one on the So-
cial policy of the EU. The two-needing 10 months were for laws in the field 
of Transport policy, and in the area of Youth protection. 
The discussion until the second reading in the EP was finished within three 
months and two weeks on average. Eight months were needed for a pro-
posal in the area of Transport policy followed by a proposal referring to the 
Culture policy, which needed 6 months. Five months were needed for two 
proposals on Health policy. Therefore only four law proposals passed the 
second reading after an over average duration and no less than 14 law pro-
posals were decided in the EP below the average duration: four after one 
month and 10 within two months. 
The consultations on the third reading (final or Co-decision) needed an ad-
ditional two months. Within the 10-researched law initiatives in the third 
stage, only one proposal needed six months, two weeks; in contrast the 
fastest needed two months two weeks. And no lesser than eight proposals 
were decided below the average duration of a discussion, namely within 
one month. 
The comparable legislative procedure in the Council showed the following 
data: Until the finding and adopting of a Common position (which was nec-
essary in 92 per cent of all Co-decision processes) a law initiative in the 
Council was discussed in average two years and four months. 
The ‘oldest’ proposals were made in the year 1994 and reached the stage of 
a Common position in 2001. One of them related to the field of Transport 
policy and one to Health policy. In the same policy area was a proposal, 
which needed three years and three months. The same time was needed for 
a proposal in Social policy. Four law initiatives, two in the fields of Health 
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policy, the Trade policy and the Environmental policy needed more than 
two years; Only half of the law initiatives, approximately 14, were finished 
for a Common position within a year. Below that mark, the Council suc-
ceeded only in ten cases, whereas six of them needed between 11 and 10 
months. 
Even when the Council did not pass the one-year threshold to find a Joint 
text-formulation (final decision), the Council normally needed at least five 
months. The longest of nine months was used for a proposal in the field of 
Education policy. This was insofar surprising, because the Common posi-
tion was found within only six months. Eight months were needed for a 
proposal in Health policy, followed by a six-month duration for two other 
proposals, one in the same policy field and one in Social policy. One joint 
text decision was made within five months and only eight of them needed 
one to four months, below the average duration. 
This data shows, the EP was more readily to decide the Co-decision stages 
in relatively short periods of time. And especially for reaching the crucial 
point of a law initiative or of a co-decision process, the Council needs 
nearly five times the period needed by the EP for the same result. The 
Common position, which is comparable to the first reading in the EP, is the 
stage at which the progress of a law initiative suffers an important lack of 
progress. Only when the Council has passed this hurdle, could the proposal 
as a whole be debated and further decided upon. It was not possible to fin-
ish the Co-decision without this agreement, when Art. 251 Amsterdam 
Treaty asked for a common decision of the EP and the Council. Thus be-
cause of the long duration of the Common position the legislation processes 
in the EU were stretched to an extent which was not intended in the reform 
ideas of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
These findings led to question for the reasons of such different decision 
making behaviour. 
At first, there is of course the structural heterogeneity of the Council. As 
the Trumpf/Pirris-Report has truly pointed out, so many negotiations, con-
ferences, formal and informal meetings etc are needed to find the compro-
mise between perhaps 15 different positions of the member states. A lot of 
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attempts to persuade the representatives with national interest to accept a 
common position in the interest of the progress of the Community are 
needed. And even if sometimes representatives have adopted such a com-
promise, changing views in the national political institutions (government, 
parliament etc.) force them to think over their decision. In the worst case, 
especially if a qualified or absolute majority is needed for a decision, the 
processes of consultations, negotiations etc. start again and the decision is 
additionally delayed. 
On the one hand, this is a major principle problem of the EU-structure and 
it is hard to find a solution.  
On the other hand, the long lasting procedures were at least substituted by a 
decision procedure, which can be characterised in summary, as the ‘closed 
shop attitude’ of the Council. Based on its long lasting competence to de-
cide alone the guidelines of the Community policies including the EU 
legislation, the Council hardly accepted the power sharing. A mentality of 
not being responsible towards anybody or anywhere on the European level 
has arisen. The responsibility – see above – was only projected towards the 
original member states. In doing so, the council members were not keen to 
making its decisions, the reasons for them, and of course more important 
their negative voting attitudes public. Therefore from its origin the Council 
was used to debate and to decide European affairs, including the legislative 
matters through a kind of secret negotiation. However this cabinet-attitude 
was not illegal, it was legally based on a few rules in the Treaties of the 
Community. The effect of this legally closed shop procedure was a self-
security of the members against the danger of blaming each other. There 
was no necessity to justify a decision or non-decision to an external viewer, 
for example the European Citizens, and they were not forced to orient - and 
perhaps - to change its positions. In summary there was no real democratic 
control over the activity of the Council. Such a situation was more than 
comfortable and it is clear that the readiness of the Council to give up these 
privileges was not emphasised. 
However, the reform intentions of the Amsterdam treaty asked the Council 
to review its procedure on Co-decisions. And the acknowledgement that in 
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the long view only a reformed Union will be accepted by the European 
Citizens was additionally important. Secondly, the declining voting rate in 
the EP – elections was truly seen as ‘writing on the wall’. – The Council 
was willingly to reform itself consequently. Therefore when the Maas-
tricht/Amsterdam Treaties postulated a new quality of power sharing with 
the EP, e.g. via the Co-decision legislation, the Council made a few steps 
towards that reform. However, – maybe affectedly – it tried to preserve at 
least partly its former position. 
One of the most succinct examples is to be seen in the huge differences be-
tween the proposals of the Trumpf/Pirris-Report and the adopted recom-
mendations of the Helsinki Summit. As it was clearly shown above, the 
Political Council was not willing to follow the reform intentions of the 
heads of its own administrative body. 
This self-preserving attitude could additionally be recognised in the forced 
method to find solutions in the way of intergovernmental con-
tacts/conferences. The Council’s interpretation of the fast track-procedure 
during the conciliation stage of a Co-decision is aimed in the same direc-
tion. The most concise attempt was the new interpretation of the informal 
trilogies. During very intensively handled, secret ‘negotiations on the 
chimney’ the Council tried to bring a Co-decision to the Common position 
maturity. In a letter to the EP 
42 he called this procedure as an ‘enlarged 
informal trilogies’ within the framework of ‘appropriate contacts’ 
43 
Finally, the attempt of the Council to persuade the EP to slow down its own 
Co-decision procedure must be remarked. Because the Council – see above 
– always needed much more time, it tried to reach a public decision process 
of equal level. Especially in the first reading before the Common position, 
the EP should wait until the time the Council shows a sign of agreement. 
All these together were regarded as well-balanced contributions of the 
Council to a new Co-decision practice.  
 
42  See footnote 39. 
43  Ibid, p. 1. 
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3) Research on Co-decision and the Public sphere 
In the introduction it was questioned, whether dealing with the European 
legislation could promote European Integration. This question can be ex-
tended to the question of under which circumstances EU-legislation could 
contribute to the identification of the Citizens with the Union. According to 
the above-mentioned general neediness for adequate information for Citi-
zens in modern times, it is to underline “a European identity will only de-
velop if Europeans are adequately informed.“
44 
Such an information could be delivered through the ability of the Citizens 
to participate in the legislation processes of the Union. If there were a real 
and substantial participation of the Citizens on the Council’s Co-decision 
procedures, the legitimacy of the EU-legislation would be strengthened 
significantly. In addition, a greater participation horizon includes a better 
possibility for controlling the legislative activities by the EU-demos. Thus 
an enlarged participation on the Co-decisions actions of the Council could 
make two major deficits in the European Union,
45 those of legitimacy and 
of democracy, less severe. Thus, the Co-decision procedure could be re-
garded much more as a process of a possible dynamic in the EU-legislation 
and therefore as a sign for a still possible dynamic of the Integration as a 
whole.  
a) Co-decision and Transparency 
As it was pointed out in the introduction, the measures for such increasing 
information should be reached via greater ‘transparency’ of the activities of 
the institutions. Since the beginning 2000, this clause is nearly magically 
propagated by the EU-institutions by representatives in meetings, confer-
ences, in print media etc. Transparency should solve all the democratic 
problems of and in the Union. To reach these aims, a greater openness and 
 
44  EP, Report Drawn up on Behalf the Committee on Youth, Culture and Education, 
Information on Sport, Radio and Television Broadcasting in the European Commu-
nity, EP.Doc 1-013/818, 1982. 
45  Höreth, Marcus, Das Demokratiedefizit lässt sich nicht wegdiskutieren, Über Sinn 
und Unsinn der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte, in Internationale Politik und 
Gesellschaft, International Politics and Society, 4/ 2000, p. 11 ff. (15-17). 
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broader information attitudes of the Union towards the public were visual-
ised. 
Therefore ‘transparency’ also played a leading role in the announcements 
of the Council, but – as the analyses above have shown, in reality. e. g. in 
the practice of the Co-decision procedure this aspect has not so strictly 
formed the basis of its co-operation with the EP. Recognising this lack dur-
ing the research was the immediate cause for a nearer view on the transpar-
ency practice in the field of Co-decision. 
Transparency in the Council is mainly limited to the possibility of public 
access to its documents and to the amount of openness of its legislative ac-
tion. 
The following part shows a good example for the use of the first transpar-
ency category, access to documents. 
(aa) Access to documents 
Within a relatively short time of 14 days after the application for research 
in the Council, the author received permission. This included researching 
the archives of the institution and in all documents relating to the Co-
decision debates and decisions. He was able to work without any control on 
the kind of documents and there was no limitation on the contents of the 
documents. The responsible administration representatives explained their 
interests on (the result of) the research and he was given every kind of sup-
port for proper research. Additionally, it was mentioned that the access, 
offered in the described manner was principally open to each person who 
fulfilled the access requirements. 
(bb) Research guidelines 
The research itself was based on a very statistical survey and concentrated 
on the analysis of the available documents, reports, protocols, press release 
etc. of the Co-decisions in the researched time. 
The legislation periods, which were to be research, were the same as in the 
duration of research,
46 from 1999 to June 2001. In doing so, a comparison 
 
46  See above p. 36. 
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on the Co-decision practice of the Council on the researched subjects, dura-
tion of Co-decisions and their public debate was enabled. 
In order to illustrate its practice as regards public access to codecision de-
bates, in a first part it was necessary to state, by way
- of comparison, the 
number and nature of Council meetings that have been public. There were 
two questions of interest: How many public debates were held in the re-
searched time and among them which kind of debates were really dedicated 
to Co-decisions. 
In a second part, there were to be researched the structure of the forms of 
and facilities of public access to the Co-decision debates of the Council. 
This should give an answer to three central questions. How many people 
e.g. European Citizens have participated, or at least, could have potentially 
participated in the debates. Secondly what kind of public participation was 
given, and which media in how many cases were used to distribute the de-
bates to the public. 
The answers should illustrate the extent to which the Council allows pub-
lic access to its debates and hence also ensures transparency as a Commu-
nity legislator, with particular reference to its conduct as co-legislator. 
Consequently, a meaningful analysis was at best possible regarding the 
question ‘of' whether' such debates were public. Though virtually impossible 
regarding the question of' ‘how', i.e. in relation to the content and actual 
conduct of its publicly accessible debates. 
b) Co-decision number and decision nature  
According to the first question in part 1 researching guidelines all Co-
decision processes in that time were to be researched, in order to evaluate 
the total number of all public debates, within the researched time; the re-
search showed the following picture: 
Total number of' ‘public' meetings in the Council: 
(a) 1999: 14 + 1 (14 limited content: 1 general debate on Charter of Fun-
damental Rights) 
(b) 2000: 15 altogether 
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(c) 2001: 7 (to May
- 2001) 
It was also interesting to evaluate the subject of those decisions, because 
this could give an image of which legislative matters the Council thought 
broader participation of the public were opportune. Maybe this could show 
too in which legislative subjects the Council was more willing to open its 
debates because this seemed necessary for an understanding by the public, 
or even if, such a matter was, in general, a topic of public interest. 
The second question on the nature of the debated subjects in the different 
years was as follows: 
(aa) 1999 
-  4 programme presentations by Council Presidencies: basic explana-
tions/discussions 
-  1 Troika programme of work an the internal 
market 
-  1 case-specific 'programme' (Kosovo) 
-  7 (8)* single-/multi-subject debates without a Commission initia-
tive concerning Co-decision provisions * ) no sufficiently precise 
data is available for the debate held at the end of December 1999 
on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is therefore not included 
in the lists and calculations  
-  2 Debates an Commission initiatives in the Co-decision sector 
-  1 x 2 legislative proposals concerning the environment policy  
-  1 x 1 proposal concerning health policy 
(bb) 2000 
-  4 program presentations by Council Presidencies: two de-
bates each: content: basic info /discussion 
-  1 debate on the white paper on services of general interest     
(continuation)  
-  1 debate on the Vienna action program 
-  1 post-conference debate on the EU-Summit (Helsinki) 
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-  1 debate following Commission communication 
-  5 single/multi-subject debates without Commission initiatives, 
concerning Co-decision provisions 
-  2 debates following formal Commission initiatives, within those: 
-  1 debate on Co-decision matters  
-  1 debate  related to agriculture (not available for a Co-
decision) 
(cc) 2001 
-  2 programme presentations by the Council Presidencies: basic 
explanations/ discussons 
-  1 debate on further refinement of the Council position con-
cerning the internal Market at the conference in Stockholm in 
2001 
-  1 debate on agriculture 
-  2 single-subject debates without Commission initiative 
-  1 debate on Co-decision matters 
Summary of the research results on the questions one and two: 
It can be seen from the survey above, the Council has conducted only a 
small number of public debates at all and much fewer in the sphere of Co-
decision. Only one of the public debated subjects really belonged to the 
Co-decision legislation. 
The Nature and organisational background of the debates were also 
interesting. 
The announcements of political programmes by the each relevant 
Presidency accounted for a relatively high number of the public de-
bates. As an exercise, each Presidency held two debates per half an year to 
present their programmes at the beginning of their Presidency. From 1999 
to May 2001, there were – including two work programmes and one 
Presidency programme on Kosovo – a total of ten such debates, at 
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which, in addition to the broad lines of financial and economic pol-
icy,
-current events (crisis, conflicts, etc.) were usually addressed. 
Other programmes that were presented at public meetings included that of 
the ‘Troika’ (D. Fin. P) on economic affairs and a separate programme on 
the Kosovo crisis. Programmes accounted for almost 30% of all publicly 
accessible debates. The content of these programmes was at most only in-
directly based on informal Commission initiatives. Consequently, none of 
these Council meetings related to specific codecision proposals or plans, 
such as are covered by the requirement for public debate laid down in Ar-
ticle 8 of the Council's Rules of Procedure. In particular in the case of 
programmes, a large portion of the debate was also devoted to presenting 
and describing the measures proposed and focused much less on a genuine 
exchange of possibly opposing views on their substance. 
d) Forms of and facilities for public participation on Co-decision de-
bates 
(aa) Public sphere via mass media 
Nowadays, public distribution of political events is often granted by using 
mass communication. In former times this kind of openness in the Council 
was not used often. But since the second half of the 1990s, the Council as 
well as the other EU-institutions reflected more and more on the use of mod-
ern mass communication. Therefore it was interesting to which extent and 
which form the Council had used as on the means for making Co-decisions 
public. Because the research of the number of public debates have delivered 
not a hopeful result, the distribution of the Co-decision-debates via public 
media could be a kind of compensation. Especially the Audio-visual media 
could contribute significantly to the emergence of political identification in 
the EU.
47 Indeed there was a relatively great number of recordings in the 
Council, but the research on that matter showed a different picture between 
the recording of the Council activities as a whole and the recording of the 
Co-decision debates. 
 
47 See: Theiler, Tobias, Why the European Union failed to Europeanise its audio-
visual policy, in: Cederman, Lars-Erik (ed.) Constructing the Europe’s Identity, the 
external dimension,, Boulder Colorado, 2001. 
  49Hubert Iral 
The first researched matter was, in how many cases there were ‘Live-
Transmissions‘ from the Council debates. Besides the audience of such a 
debate, this method is the most important transmission because the ‘orator’ 
of the event in a high manner is committed to the ongoing processes. In 
addition, there is a high grade of authentic feeling, if such a close listening 
to the actual discussion is possible. 
However, as Table 2 shows, none of the public debates following on from 
a Commission initiative, including Co-decisions, were transmitted 'live' to 
the public during the period under consideration. LIVE transmission was 
possible only for debates outside these two areas and then only to a rela-
tively small extent. 
(bb) Recording of Co-decisions 
A record of the debates of the Council on mass media was made in Brus-
sels or Luxembourg. That was not done only for the archive of the Council 
itself; any interested external institution, organisation, individual person 
etc., was offered access to the records. The only prerequisite was an appli-
cation to the responsible Council administration. With regard to the con-
tents of the recording, during the research no special system for such a re-
cord was recognised, i.e. only certain legislative subjects were recorded.  
(aaa) Types of recording 
A distinction is made between the two categories AUDIO/ VIDEO: 
these are the generally permitted forms of media recording at the Council's 
public debates. As the data show AUDIO transmission was used twice as 
often for debates not based on Commission legislative initiatives. Over 
50% of debates based on Commission initiatives were the subject of 
AUDIO transmission. However, the overall very low frequency of debates 
in this sector puts this figure into context. In the case of non-initiative 
debates, VIDEO comes about half-way between LIVE and AUDIO. In the 
case of the other debates, VIDEO was less common than AUDIO. 
(bbb) Recording (rights) in the conference room 
In the respect of broader public distribution it is also of interest what the 
conditions for a record of the Co-decision debates are. In other words who 
is responsible for the recording. Is this, for example, a member state which 
  50Between Forces of Inertia and Dynamics 
has a special interest on a certain legislation matter, or the media 
institutions, Broadcasting Stations, TV-Stations from the Member states, 
film organizations etc, actually external bodies with perhaps or even mostly 
large consumer base for these ‘products’. The perception of such 
distribution lends itself easier to the broader public sphere than a recording 
by the EU-Institution itself. However the research on that matter showed, 
all recording and filming of debates was done exclusively by units 
belonging to Community or EU institutions and bodies. There are two 
administration bodies which were exclusively ordered to record the 
Council meetings. One from the Council itself, called Internal Council 
Service and one ordered by the Commission, known as KANAKNA. Both 
instititions made in general three kinds of media cassettes from the 
recordings: VHS and/or BETA and/or audiocassettes of the debates. This 
seems at first view a relatively broadly spread record base for the public con-
sumers. However the small number of the recordings in the whole time 
1999- 2001 reduces this image immediately. Only one VHS, one video OR 
and 5 audiocassettes were made of the Co-decision debates. It must be 
born in mind that three of the audio cassettes were made of the debate on 8 
March 2001 alone, which means that, during the whole of the preceding 
period, only two audio recordings were made of debates. 
In the Union with 11 official languages, the structure of the recorded lan-
guages is most important. One should think that in this regard the re-
cording would have reflected this necessity, and the records would be 
available in many languages. However, as far as the language of the re-
cordings is concerned, the emphasis was mainly on French and English. 
Only in very few cases were recordings made in other languages, e.g. 
German. 
(cc) Presence and transmission of radio and TV broadcasting or-
ganisations 
A good picture of the public distribution throughout the member state can 
give the research of the fullness of the broadcasting of Council meetings, 
respectively of Co-decision negotiations and decisions. The central ques-
tion is, how many meetings of Council legislative activities, and especially 
those on Co-decisions, the broadcasting stations in member states       
transmitted. If there were a lot of them, this could also negate the lack of 
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mitted. If there were a lot of them, this could also negate the lack of other 
public participation on Co-decision. The kind of information which the 
member states broadcasting organisations sent out in regard of Council ac-
tivities is also interesting. This could give a picture whether there is in the 
different member states more or a less interest on such a broadcasting ser-
vice. 
In Table 3 the broadcasting attitudes were listed. Here, too, a distinction is 
made between (General) debates not based on Commission initiatives, 'ini-
tiative'-type debates (INI) and codecision debates (COD). 
As Table 3 points out clearly there was an almost alarmingly low number of 
broadcasts sent from Brussels/Luxembourg to public debates of the Council 
in that time. 
This is not only true for both private and public broadcasters. The same 
can be said in regard to the number of countries from which the radio 
and/or TV broadcasters came.  
Spanish broadcasters were present most often, on altogether five occa-
sions, to transmit debates to the public, followed by French and German 
broadcasters (on three occasions each), and Portuguese, Swedish and UK 
broadcasters (on two occasions each). TV stations from Belgium and 
Austria were present on one occasion each, but broadcasters from 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg, i.e. a third of EU Mem-
ber States, were not present at all. 
On one occasion (in 2000), there was coverage by EUROVISION. 
In comparison, a relatively high number of EU-external broadcasting sta-
tions have broadcasted from Council meetings in that time; the following 
non-EU broadcasting organisations were involved in broadcasting 
Council debates: 
 
Reuters  1  (1999)
CNN 2 (once in 1999: once in 2000)
RTL -Hungary 1  (1999)
Radio Turkey  1    (2000 ) 
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(dd) Openness of meetings to individuals: report-
ers/observers/audience  
While above in the paper, the indirect or personal participation on the 
Co-decision meetings of the Council was analysed, in the following part 
the participation in the Council-locations shall be examined. This means, 
on the one hand, the opportunities for local participation in the Council 
building, and on the other hand, the participation of different persons, 
groups, delegations etc. in the conference rooms of both conference loca-
tions Brussels and Luxembourg. 
First it should be mentioned that the public participation in Council legisla-
tion is separated from the conference room. In contrast to the plenary of the 
EP in Strasbourg e.g., the public in the Council is clearly divided from the 
debating politicians. Even if the visitor area in Strasbourg is upstairs sepa-
rated from the hemicycle, the atmosphere of the discussion carries over and 
the participation gives visitors an idea of what is happening live. In the case 
of the Council, the visitors have only the possibility to follow the discus-
sions and debates on a large video Monitor in a press room beside the Con-
ference room. Such a ‘sterile’ orator-location does not really transmit the 
debating culture, the personal aura of the politicians and their attitude to-
wards this or another decision. The concrete event of the political struggle 
or the fight for positions and decision making, become more or less under-
standable and therefore some legislation act more or less acceptable by the 
public. 
(ee) Presence of media representatives 
Usually today journalists, correspondents, commentators etc. from print or 
communication media are the distributors of the policy to the public. In this 
respect, one of the most important groups even now, if not the most impor-
tant participants, are the members or representatives of the media. Espe-
cially when they visualise the debates and report from the Council meet-
ings. Thus, if these people or groups reported from the Council legislation 
e.g. Co-decisions in a regular and substantial manner, a good portion of 
openness or transparency in these legislation processes would be realised. 
Therefore it was necessary to research to which extent members of the       
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media organisations have participated as orators in the Council meetings 
and especially on the Co-decision activities in that time. Studying the ap-
propriate press releases in the Council, the view of the average participa-
tion of those orators, essentially debilitated the transparency-function of 
those groups, persons etc. 
In general, the number of journalists, reporters, commentators etc. following 
debates in the meeting room (as reporters/observers) fluctuated enormously, 
ranging from one to 130. At the first glance this result does not seem too 
serious, but in the vast majority of cases, there were only between five and 
ten reporters, correspondents etc. present. 
On top of that, the data for Co-decision observation tended much more in a 
direction of less-transparency: 
Codecision debates were observed only on five days by a total of 30 jour-
nalists in the whole time, i.e. an average of six. The highest number (10) 
were present on 18 November 1999 and on 8 March 2001, and with one 
the lowest number on 10 October 2000. 
(ff) Audience 
The above described authentic event of live participation on political dis-
cussions in fact is best realised by broad-based audience, i.e. in the Council 
meetings. 
As in the case of journalists, the Council's public debates are sparsely at-
tended; on the first view a very respectable number of members of the 
public attended the Council-meetings. The best-attended debate in this 
respect, with an audience of 80, was that of 16 March 2000. Next came 
three or four debates with an audience of about 70. However, this is only 
one side. On the other side, the vast majority of debates have an audience 
of less than 10, and in many cases there is no audience whatsoever. It 
should additionally be pointed out that only in the rarest of cases is there 
an audience comprising a random cross-section of EU-Citizens. In the case 
of almost 90% of debates, the members of the audience belong to organi-
sations, delegations, groups, associations or school classes visiting the 
Council. 
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A distinction is also to be drawn between those voluntarily following the 
debates (called vrais public) and those specially sent to the Council or 
delegated by institutions with a professional interest (délégués), as well as 
diplomats observing the various debates. In the statistics, they are all 
lumped together under the heading 'public'. This fact helps puts into context 
what are often, at first sight, surprisingly high numbers of visitors in quite a 
number of cases. 
e) Time and duration of public debates 
Not only the small number of public debates and the local arrangements 
should be mentioned. Even if a debate was offered to the public, the ar-
rangements for such an event were additionally strange and not unhelpful 
for a better understanding of EU-legislation and the identification of the 
Citizens with the Union. 
Many publicly accessible parts of debates were scheduled for the period 
before lunch and extended into the lunch break. Some were held at the end 
of the working day or towards the close of business at the Council. Few of 
them began in the early morning. 
Public access to debates was more or less limited to two hours in every 
case. Only in a few cases was this amount of time exceeded, by a quarter of 
an hour to half an hour. In some cases, debates were accessible to the pub-
lic for considerably less than two hours. 
4) Council-Presidencies and public Co-decision practice 
Finally it was interesting to analyse, whether there was a difference in the 
Co-decision practice in regard to the member state serving as Council 
Presidents. In other words, was Germany much more willing than for ex-
ample France to open the Co-decision debates towards the public. 
As Table 4 shows in the time between 1999 and May 2001 there were ex-
actly 5 Co-decision issues discussed in a public manner. Two debates for 
instance were initiated by the Finish Presidency, whereby one debate in-
cluded two different legislation initiatives. Each one debate was initiated by 
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the Presidencies of France and Sweden. No debates took place during the 
Presidencies of Germany and Portugal. 
The low level of transparency.  
To sum up the Council’s Co-decision transparency practice and to answer 
the three questions in the second part of the research on Co-decisions and 
the public sphere, it is to say: 
Irrespective of its change for the better at the Helsinki Summit and the cor-
responding amendments to its own rules of procedure, the Council has still 
not really managed to change its form. As before, the vast majority of de-
bates are not public, and few debates on (formal) Commission initiatives - 
and almost none where these relate to codecision matters - are held in pub-
lic. 
Comparing the pre- and post-Helsinki situations, no difference can be de-
tected as regards legislative activities. This is particularly true in the case 
of Council debates on Commission initiatives in the field of codecision. 
The Council's post-Helsinki practices thus do not differ from its pre-
Helsinki practices. 
The figures analysed here show instead that the greater transparency advo-
cated has (still) not been achieved: 
-  A figure of only 15 public debates out of a total of over 90 debates 
a year run counter to the wording of Article 8(2) of the Council's 
Rules of Procedure (see below), 
-  The presence of at most four or five TV/radio broadcasting or-
ganisations per public debate yields far too low a transmission 
rate; in addition, no broadcasting organisations at all are present in 
the case of quite a few public debates, 
-  Media access is in any case also too low; recordings are in many 
cases confined to KANAKNA and the internal Council service 
(Service intern), 
-  There is relatively little coverage of debates by journalists. With no 
journalists present at 37% of the debates, and an even lower figure 
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in the case of Commission initiatives and codecision, there is an 
obvious deficit in this area, 
-  Lastly, public attendance at debates in the form of an audience 
is far from satisfactory. Whilst large numbers were present at 
some debates, such figures are not representative of the figures for 
public attendance in general. For many debates, the audience was 
small, consisting of up to about 10 people. 
Therefore, against the strong reform proposals on transparency in the legis-
lation of the Trumpf/Pirris-Report, the practice of the Council in the Co-
decision procedure is still restrictively handled. More over the more cau-
tious formulated/structured suggestions of the Helsinki-Summit were not 
really adopted in its day-to-day work. And even the fact that both institu-
tions were situated in its own ‘camp’, the Council hasn’t moved to change 
substantially its practice on Co-decision procedure. Neither the total num-
ber of Co-decisions, nor in regard to organising the public background of 
its debates, a measurable change could be recognised. This is true in regard 
to the technical facilities as well as in regard to the attendance possibilities 
in the Council. Less encouraging is also the audience quota. The presence 
of representatives of the media and the audiences of Citizens in Co-
decisions debates were far below a rate which would have justified a real 
participation, in contrast in both cases the quota could be marked as rather 
marginal. 
Comparing the pre- and post-Helsinki situations, no difference can be de-
tected as regards legislative activities. This is particularly true in the case 
of Council debates on Commission initiatives in the field of codecision. 
The Council's post-Helsinki practices thus do not differ from its pre-
Helsinki practices. 
For all these reasons, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Coun-
cil displays very little and totally insufficient transparency when acting in 
a legislative capacity. 
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VI. Rules of Procedure and Co-decision transparency  
The not so exciting findings on the transparency in the Co-decision practice 
of the Council has promoted the question, whether the Council has been 
acting in correspondence with legal orders at all. The relevant rules for its 
legislating procedures were to be found in its Rules of Procedures
48, as a 
(self-) commitment instruction for its whole function as a supreme Organ 
of the Union. 
Following the recommendations on the Helsinki-Summit, on June 5
th, 2000 
the Council reformed its Rule of procedure. This was also done in regard to 
its legislative activities e.g. the Co-decision procedure. 
In this regard, the relevant articles are the Art. 8 and 9 Rules of Procedure 
of the Council (in the following RPC). In this amendment the newly formu-
lated Art. 8 ‘public debates’ was obviously directed towards a better trans-
parency of the legislative working of the Council. First this intention is to 
be seen in the wording of both rules. The wording of Article 8(2) RPC of 
the Council's Rules of Procedure is cited above with regard to the adequacy 
of transparency. It is necessary now in conclusion to make a more detailed 
analysis and to consider the problems it poses in terms of its effects on the 
EU' s legislative procedure. 
The words 'important new legislative proposals"
49 mean that all important 
Commission initiatives, i.e. those on topical subjects, must be covered. 
Otherwise, if only some of those proposals were to be subject to a 
requirement for public debate, then the relevant passage of the Rules of 
Procedure would have to read differently, so that the Council would be 
justified in making a selection, and the limiting of public debates to such a 
low number would at least be somewhat more plausible. 
This interpretation of the Art. 8 2 RPC is secondly to verify the French and 
German version of the rule. In the French version Art 8 (2) RPC is 
formulated: “Le Conseil tient au moins un débat public sur les nouvelles 
 
48  Official Journal of the European Communities, L 149/21 from 23. 6. 2000, Council, 
Council Decision of 5 June, adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure.  
49  Ibid, L 149/24. 
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proposition législative importantes…
50And the German version pointed out 
clearly. “Der Rat hält mindestens eine öffentliche Aussprache über die 
wichtigen neuen Gesetzgebungsvorschläge ab...“
51 Both wordings make 
clear that each important legislative matter, initiated by the Commission is 
to be debated in the Council in a public sphere. In regard to the EU-law and 
its manifold wording it is an often and well used practice in cases of 
controversial rules to interpret it with the comparison of the different 
wordings. 
As pointed out above – only a small percentage of all the legislation and 
especially of Co-decisions were debated and adopted with the public. Thus 
only this small number of legislative subjects or acts seems ‘important’ 
enough to the Council for public debate. However the problems and the 
subjects to be settled by law, i.e. economics, trade, finances, workforce, 
social, environmental matters etc. were so various and manifold that thus a 
low percentage of public debates seems much too few. The real situation to 
be regulated by means of legislation and the nature of the legislation 
actually adopted in that period tell a different story. 
The actual right to make a selection based on the importance of a 
legislative matter should not and cannot be questioned here. There are two 
aspects, however, which need to be addressed: 
The Pre-condition in Art 8 (3) that the Council or the COREPER may 
decide by qualified majority on a case-by-case basis that other public 
debates are to be held on important issues affecting the interests of the 
Union,
52 substitute these interpretations of Art. 8 (2). Only in specially 
exposed cases should the Council decide, whether it wanted to discuss in 
public. In all other cases the public debates should be the regular 
procedure. 
 
50  Journal officiel des Communautés européene, L 149 du 23/06/2000, Conseil, Déci-
sion du Conseil du juin 2000, portant adoption de son règlement intérieur, p. 
149/24. 
51 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, RAT, Beschluss des Rates vom 5. 
Juni 2000 zur Festlegung der Geschäftsordnung, L 149/24. 
52  Official Journal of the European Communities, L 149/21 from 23. 6. 2000, Council, 
Council Decision of 5 June, adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, L.149/24. 
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Further on: Art 8 (2) when to read together with Art. 9 (1) RPC orders a 
far-reaching public making of all activities and documents of the Council 
when it is acting in its legislative capacity. 
In the same manner the ruling character of Art. 5 (1) RPC stated that public 
meetings of the Council, when it was acting in the case of Art. 8 are the 
regular procedure in its Co-decision activities. 
Finally, there is the intention of the Trumpf/Pirris-Report respectively the 
spirit of the Helsinki-Recommendations which not only questioned a 
replacement of the current practice of open Council debates by opening 
genuine debates for the public e.g. at the initial stage of discussing major 
legislative proposals. Concerning that it was suggested ensuring more 
intersting public debates and discussens in the Council. 
53 
Therefore in a high percentage, the Council is required to debate Co-
decisions in a public sphere. It’s own Rules oblige it to such a legislation 
attittude. 
The same can be said in regard to its duty towards media transmission of 
the debates to the public. According to Art. 8 (3), it is generally obliged to 
make debates public by transmission via audio-visual means
54 
Conclusions and outlook 
After the implementation of the rules of the Amsterdam Treaty in the 
Community law, it was shown that the procedure did not work well and the 
tensions between the three institutions participating on Co-decisions had 
been increased. The problems were to be found on the side of the Commis-
sion and of the EP, but much more in realm of the Council. However, the 
main intentions for a reform of the legislation practice i.e. the Co-decision 
procedures did not come from the Council. 
Therefore, at the end of the 1999s, the EP had steadily tried to improve the 
Co-decision procedure; a lot of suggestions and proposals were made by 
 
53  The European Council: Helsinki Summit 1999, Operational Recommendations Nr. 
29. 
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different bodies, commissions, individuals etc. from that institution. The 
promoter of these requirements was the largest Party group in the EP, the 
EPP-Group. However, other sub-bodies of the EP, committees, commis-
sions and its administration body participated substantially on those reform 
endeavours. 
Only in connection with the decision for an Enlargement of the Community 
were two leading representatives of the Council able to suggest their inten-
tion for a reformed legislative procedure in the Council. These proposals, 
written in a report on the future ‘Operation of the Council’, included a far-
reaching re-organisation of the Co-decision procedure in the Council. 
However, the Helsinki-Summit which was questioned about adopting the 
report did not agree with the most far-reaching intentions of the proposals 
on Co-decision practice. Therefore the Recommendation for the Reform 
only formally suggested a new structuring of the Council’s Co-decision 
practice, e. g. the future organisation of the public debates. In contrast to its 
propagated increase of transparency in its work including the Co-decision 
procedure, the guidelines for the Council’s Co-decision practice were not 
really structured towards a more open and public procedure. 
Thus the following amendment to the Council’s Rules of Procedure did 
implement these guidelines according to its formal character, but did not 
fulfil the true intention of changing the real Co-decision attitude of the 
Council. On the other hand the formulation in the reformed Rules of proce-
dure of the Council contains a very clear order to allow much more trans-
parency in the Co-decision practice. The wordings of the most appropriate 
rules give the deciding bodies a clear order for a process, which includes 
regular public discussion on Co-decision matters. In spite of this, the analy-
sis of the Co-decision practice has shown, that the Council had not really 
changed its Co-decision after the Helsinki-Impulses; as before in 1999, in 
2000 and 2001 the vast majority of debates were not public. Only a small 
number of debates on (formal) Commission initiatives – and almost none 
where these relate to Co-decision matters – were held in public. The low 
number/figure of public debates runs counter to the wording of the       
 
54  See footnote 49. 
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Council's Rules of Procedure. In doing so the Council disregarded its own 
working-base and its self-obliged law order for its Co-decision practice. 
Therefore in its Co-decision practice the Council had been acting against its 
own legal order and rule base. 
More over the Co-decision procedure has hurt the spirit of the necessity of 
a reformed Union, as it was the corner stone, propagated for betterment at 
the Helsinki Summit. 
Up to 2001 the Council was not really ready for a substantial change in its 
closed shop attitude. Against the propagated necessity for change and 
against self-obliged commitments for more transparency in its work, the 
Co-decision practice did not justify that. 
Structurally in these restrictively handled Co-decision procedures there 
were mirrored the old problems of the Union and its unique Integration 
deficits, as were described above. The excessive orientation towards the 
interests of its member states and the lack of democratic control can still be 
recognised in the Council; These problems and deficits have not been over-
come by a new practice in its Co-decision. This Co-decision practice 
seemed much more a sign for the Forces of Inertia in the Union. 
However, there is little hope for the future. One of the main intentions of 
the Second Convention of the EU is to implement a basic institutional re-
form into the currently structured European Constitution. 
Within one of the most discussed proposals to the Convention, the 
German–French paper, there are a few interesting suggestions for re-
forming the Co-decision procedure. 
Firstly, and in general, the Co-decision competencies of the EP should 
be strengthened essentially in order to relate the legislation competen-
cies more into the EP, as the more democratically legitimatised institu-
tion. Secondly, the Council competencies should be divided more 
clearly. On the one hand in the executive competencies and on the 
other hand in that of the legislative competencies. Thirdly, the latter 
must be structured in a much more public and transparent manner. And 
last but not least the proposal has propagated the implementation of the 
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‘early warning system’ into the legislative part of the future Constitu-
tion. This means directing each Commission law initiative not only at 
the EP and the Council, but also at the same time directing it at the na-
tional parliaments. This should offer them firstly the ability to be in-
formed at an early stage of a legislation proposal of the Union, and 
secondly they should have the possibility to contribute to make an im-
pact on the legislative processes. With this method the parliaments are 
no longer referred to the information by the Governments, respectively 
the responsible ministers, but they are able to ‘react’ at very early 
stage of such a Co-decision. 
If all these subjects would become binding rules in the new Constitu-
tion and if these rules would replace the relatively vague orders in the 
current legal basis it would help to lift the Co-decision to a new rank in 
the European legislative processes. Legitimated more by the participa-
tion of the national parliaments and more democratically controlled 
through more openness and transparency, such a Co-decision could be 
truly seen as a sign of dynamics and progress in the EU. 
In summary, the results of this study lead to either optimistic or pessi-
mistic assessment regarding the potential of the Co-decision-
procedure. If you tend towards optimism, the formal rules of the Co-
decision-procedure undoubtedly indicate progress. On the other hand, 
if you tend towards pessimism or more accurately realism, it is an irri-
tating fact of inertia that the political actors especially in the Council 
do not meet their own standards, and obey the rules of the game suffi-
ciently. Therefore the current state of the Co-decision procedure does 
not suffer from a lack of democratic well-meaning, but rather from a 
lack of political will. Thus, what is required to reach progress by en-
hancing the democratic legitimacy, is not primarily a comprehensive 
institutional reform. Rather it is necessary that the member state gov-
ernments do not hurt their own rules of transparency, which is the 
minimum standard for democracy.  
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Annex 
 
Tables 1-4 Table 1: Average Processing on Co-decisions in the period between 1999 – 2001 
1 The European Parliament 
                      X                                 A                            B                  C                                                                                                                      Y 
Initiative         
 *        ** ***
 
2. The Council 
                      X                                                                                                                                                                             D                         E  Y 
Initiative       
 ****     *****
 
X  Receive of the Initiative          Y   Final of Legislation Procedure 
A First  Reading 
B Second  Reading 
C Third  Reading 
 
*  Preliminary Time First Reading       5 Months 
**  Preliminary Time Second Reading      3  Months / 2 Weeks 
***  Preliminary Time Third Reading  (Co-decision)   2 Months 
 
D  Common Position       
E  Joint Text                  
 
****  Preliminary Time   Common Position      2 Years / 4 Months 
*****  Preliminary Time   Joint Text        5 Months  
 
 Table 2: LIVE transmission and records of the Council debates 
Year LIVE  AUDIO  VIDEO 
 General  INI  COD  General INI  COD  General  INI  COD 
1999 5  -  -  15  -  2    5  -  - 
2000 4  -  -  12  1  1  13  1  1 
2001/5  4  -  -    5      3  -  - 
                  
Total 13  -  -  32  2  3  21  1  1 
General.   Debates in generally 
INI:     Debates on a Commission Initiative 
COD:     Debates on Co-decision subjects  
 Table 3: Broadcasting and TV-quota by the member state between 
1999-2001/5  
 
Member  
state 
Austria Belgium  Germany 
Year  General INI COD  General  INI COD  General INI COD 
1999 -  -  -  - -  - - -  - 
2000 1  -  -  1 -  - - - - 
2001/5 - - -  - -  - - -  - 
               
Total 1  -  -  1 -  - - - - 
                 
Member 
state 
France Finland  Germany 
Year  General INI COD  General  INI COD  General INI COD 
1999 -  -  -  -  -  -  2  -  - 
2000 3  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  - 
2001/5 - - -  -  - -  - - - 
              
Total 3  -  - -  -  -  3  -  - 
                  
Member 
state 
Greece Italy Ireland 
Year  General INI COD  General  INI COD  General INI COD 
1999  - - -  - - - - - - 
2000  - - -  - - - - - - 
2001/5 - - -  -  - -  - - - 
              
Total  - - -  - - - - - - 
                  
Member 
state 
Luxembourg Netherlands  Portugal 
Year  General INI COD  General  INI COD  General INI COD 
1999 -  -  -  2  -  -  1  -  - 
2000 -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  - 
2001/5 - - -  -  - -  - - - 
              
Total -  -  -  2  -  -  2  -  - 
                  Member 
state 
Sweden Spain  UK 
Year  General INI  COD  General INI  COD General INI  COD 
1999 -  -  -  2  -  -  1  -  - 
2000 -  -  -  1  -  -  1  -  - 
2001/5 2 - -  2  - -  -  - - 
              
Total 2  -  -  5  -  -  2  -  - 
 
General:  General public debate 
INI    Debate on Commission Initiative 
COD   Co-decision  debate 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 4: Nature of public debates in the Council between 1999 and 2001/ 5; Number of Co-decision-
debates initiated by different Presidencies 
Year      Presidency Public  Debates
        
Council acting on  
Co-decision Issues  General Proposals/Initiatives Co-decisions all
1999 / I  Germany   6  -  -    6
1999 / II  Finland          7  - - 9
    Environment      - -    1**   
    Health      - - 1   
             
2000 / 1   Portugal          8  - - 8
             
            
2000 / II  France          5  - - 7
    Environment     1   
            1* 
             
2000 / I  Sweden          6  - 7
until 31 
May  
  Environment      - . 1   
            
            
Total         32 1* 4  37 
*)   this debate referred to the Agriculture Council   
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